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Reconstructing the Union was the ambitious but timely theme of CEPS’ fourth big forum for debate, the Ideas Lab. 
Experts from 11 policy domains shared their insights on the many and complex challenges facing Europe. In the view of 
many participants, this was the best Ideas Lab to date, with a total of 834 attending the event over two days. 
This report gives an overview of the insights gleaned from the many discussions that took place during Lab and plenary 
sessions, prime talks and interactive debates.  
The 2017 CEPS Ideas lab was organised in collaboration with the Maltese Presidency of the European Council and the 
Malta Financial Services Authority; we are enormously grateful to both for their support and contributions. A number of 
other research institutes and foundations also contributed to individual Labs with both human and financial resources, and 
various CEPS corporate members also provided financial support. We thank them all for helping to make this year’s Ideas 
Lab a success.
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4Speaker: Joseph Muscat, Prime Minister of Malta
CEPS Chairman Joaquín Almunia opened the event, 
highlighting its unique interactive features as a meeting 
place for policymakers, think-tankers, academics and 
representatives of the business world.
Jocelyn Kiley of the Pew Research Center briefly presented 
their study on the attitudes of Americans and Europeans 
towards diversity and refugees. Ms Kiley concluded that 
while there were huge differences of opinion among 
Europeans on these issues, a common finding was that 
young people in all countries were more willing to “embrace 
diversity” and see refugees as a benefit to societies.
The keynote address was given by the Right Honourable 
Joseph Muscat, Prime Minister of Malta. In keeping with 
the experimental nature of an Ideas Lab, he offered up five 
ideas to “provoke” debate. Mr Muscat stressed, however, 
that he was speaking in his capacity as a frustrated 
European citizen rather than as the Prime Minister of his 
country. His discussion points were:
■	 	The EU should create a Social Pact to counter the 
many inequalities created by globalisation; the Pact 
should be linked to the idea of a social union and 
social mobility.
■	 	 The EU should set up a European ‘Brexit’ Fund to 
counter populism in communities that feel detached 
from the European project.
■	 	Europe should stay engaged with Turkey and open 
Chapter 24 negotiations on Justice, Freedom and 
Security. 
■	 	Citizenship should be an innovative policy tool used by 
member states to give home to talented minds in the 
global race for the future.
■	 	Europe should become the “Bitcoin continent”; 
rather than resist the slow rise of crypto-currencies, 
European regulators should be more innovative in how 
they protect consumers.
The ensuing question and answer session revealed that 
there is indeed a great demand for the EU to innovate in 
order to stay relevant for its citizens.
After the opening keynote speech, participants dispersed 
into the parallel discussion sessions, which are summarised 
in the following pages.
Opening Plenary: Reconstructing the Union
   Jocelyn Kiley, Joseph Muscat and Joaquín Almunia
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Culture and content in the digital single market
Discussion Leaders: Per Strömbäck, Member of the 
Board of the Swedish Film Institute, and Editor, Netopia; 
Patrick Messerlin, Professor, Sciences Po; Pierre-Jean 
Benghozi, Commissioner, French National Authority for 
Electronic Communications and Postal Services (ARCEP)
Moderator: Giuseppe Mazziotti, Professor, Trinity College 
Dublin and Associate Research Fellow, CEPS
Sensors and senses: Trust and privacy in the 
internet of things
Discussion Leaders: Nikos Isaris, Deputy Head, Internet of 
Things Unit, European Commission;  Tim Watson,  Director, 
Cyber Security Centre, University of Warwick; Nick Wallace, 
Senior Policy Analyst, Centre for Data Innovation; Stacey-
Ann Elvy, Associate director of the Centre for Business 
and Financial Law, New York Law School
Moderator: Lorenzo Pupillo, Associate Senior Research 
Fellow,  CEPS
Open science, open innovation, open to the 
world?
Discussion Leaders: Robert Schröder, Member of Cabinet, 
Commissioner Moedas, European Commission;  Reinhilde 
Veugelers, Professor of Managerial Economics, Strategy 
and Innovation, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven; Robert 
Madelin, Chief Strategist, Fipra International; John 
Higgins, Director General, DIGITALEUROPE
Moderator: Andrea Renda, Senior Research Fellow and 
Head of Regulatory Policy Unit, CEPS
Introduction
The internet is transforming both manufacturing and 
services industries, upending our society and presenting 
Europe with tremendous opportunities and challenges. Our 
Lab sessions reflected this mixed picture.
On the positive side, Europe’s tech sector is booming, with 
record levels of investment in 2016 it is developing into 
a competitor to Silicon Valley. Its most advanced digital 
countries (in small peripheral states) are world-class 
performers, ahead of the US in most measurements of 
digital literacy and adoption. Many parts of the EU lead the 
world in e-government and in using digital technology to 
update and automate their public services. Even traditional 
European industries, from cars to coal, are increasing their 
digital investment.
On the negative side, Europe risks killing this golden goose 
through overregulation. Its talented entrepreneurs face 
high regulatory hurdles when scaling up to reach global 
markets. Far too few funds are pouring into high-speed web 
infrastructure. European content industries are suffering 
and need to find a sustainable way of recreating their 
business models.
This Lab examined two key challenges to realising a full 
digital single market for Europe: how to support culture and 
content production and distribution, and how to shore up 
public trust and security as the internet becomes ubiquitous. 
A third session looked at how the EU’s innovation policy 
should be designed to tackle societal challenges and propel 
Europe towards global leadership.
Key points arising from the discussions
Content industries are facing a revolution. New internet 
technologies such as user-generated platforms and on-
demand streaming have transformed earlier subscription 
and advertising models. Search and social media platforms 
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dominate the news diet of many readers and these powerful 
internet intermediaries are capturing a high share of content 
value. Through data analytics and algorithms, internet 
players match users’ preferences with supply. With this 
built-in advantage, internet platforms are becoming vertical 
powerhouses, controlling both production and distribution. 
Yet public trust is a fragile thing. Many Europeans fear the 
internet and its hold on their lives, and are particularly fearful 
of having their privacy invaded. Following the Snowden 
revelations, many are wary of increased government 
surveillance. End-to-end encryption and cyber-security 
protection offer some reassurance, but not enough. 
Communication service providers rely on access to user 
data for revenue and product functionality. At the same 
time, insufficient private and public investment in cyber 
security was singled out as a danger in a world in which 
all our cars and household devices are moving online. In 
particular, experts worry about the safety of critical energy 
and defence infrastructures. 
Implications for policymakers
European policymakers must avoid imposing too much 
regulation and fragmentation on digital sectors. Instead 
of creating a truly seamless digital single market, many 
participants saw the opposite happening in European 
Commission proposals. For example, the Commission’s 
new telecom rules could force messaging apps, which 
now offer all Europeans the same service, to offer different 
services in different EU countries. 
Participants felt strongly that net neutrality rules should be 
reinforced to ensure non-discriminatory access to content. 
They encouraged regulators to be careful before applying 
burdensome rules to dynamic and competitive ecosystems. 
If quotas on platforms are imposed, they will fail. Rather 
than reinforcing start-ups, these restrictions will reinforce 
the power of large, often American, platforms, which have 
the resources to manage invasive rules. 
It will be difficult for policymakers to find a coherent way 
forward. Regulation is required in a different way for each 
of the internet’s layers: on infrastructure where security 
vulnerabilities abound; at the service level for which liability 
regimes and the question of standardisation are key; and 
at the consumer level, where privacy must be respected 
and confidence reinforced. In each case, too stringent rules 
and a lack of European harmonisation could hamper new 
services.
Governments should reduce barriers to innovation. True 
success for Europe’s tech sector will only come bottom up 
and government should encourage these fast-growing ICT 
ecosystems. It must help accelerate, not slow down, the 
collaborative economy. A true digital single market is still a 
good idea: Europe’s patchwork of national markets and its 
fragmented approach to core transmission networks appear 
anachronistic. More broadly, the EU should emphasise 
the role of openness and collaboration by providing open 
access to the results of publicly funded research, promoting 
open science, engaging more transparently with citizens 
and endorsing open innovation models to tackle societal 
challenge and long-term goals. One conclusion is clear: 
Europe must build on its present momentum and move 
rapidly into the digital era.
Special Session: Europe’s Digital Frontrunners 
Powering the continent’s surprising internet 
success story?
Speakers: James Waterworth, Vice President, CCIA;  Niclas 
Colliander, Senior Consultant, Boston Consulting Group; 
Tom Wehmeier, Principal and Head of Research, Atomico; 
Hosuk Lee Makiyama, Director of Open Political Economy, 
Network; Christine Muller Andreassen, Advisor, Permanent 
Representation of Denmark to the EU
Moderator: William Echikson, Head of Digital Forum, CEPS
Introduction
Rather than falling behind fast-moving Asia and Silicon Valley 
in the global digital race, new research shows that Europe is 
catching up fast. Certain digital frontrunners are beginning 
to organise into a potent force, especially on the edges of the 
Union. Sixteen small European Union countries, from Denmark 
to Ireland and Estonia have formed a pro-internet ‘like-minded’ 
group. Together, they recently wrote a letter urging Brussels to 
ban data localisation. 
Digital Economy & Innovation
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In its ‘State of European Tech’ report, London firm Atomico 
notes that the EU’s tech sector invested a record-setting 
$13.6 billion last year, compared with $2.8 billion in 2011. 
And in its Digital Frontrunners study, Boston Consulting 
underlines how many small, export-oriented European Union 
members rank well above the US in what the consultants 
call e-intensity, measuring IT infrastructure, internet access 
and businesses, consumers and government engagement 
in internet-related activities. These ‘digital frontrunners’ 
generate about 8% of GDP from the internet, compared to 
5% in Europe’s Big Five, Germany, UK, France, Spain and 
Italy – and digitalisation is expected to generate 1.6 million 
to 2.3 million more jobs than it eliminates in these front-
running countries between 2015 and 2020.
Of course, weaknesses remain. Europe has not produced 
a tech giant to rival those in Silicon Valley, and although 
European tech entrepreneurs find it as easy as their 
American counterparts to raise startup funds, later-stage 
capital committed in the US is 14 times greater than that in 
Europe. That cash gap would disappear if European pension 
funds would allocate just 0.6% more of their capital under 
management to venture investments. 
Implications for policymakers  
A key weakness is the lack of a true European single 
digital market. In the US or China, tech entrepreneurs 
receive immediate access to a continent-wide population. 
In Europe, they still must navigate 28 different consumer 
tastes and regulatory regimes. 
Although the European Commission promised to create 
a single digital market two years ago, estimating that it 
could boost the European Union’s economy by €415 billion 
annually, there was little optimism among participants 
about achieving this goal. Many believe the digital 
regulations proposed will move in the opposite direction 
and increase fragmentation. The staunchest critics see 
the digital single market measures favouring traditional 
corporatist old industries.
The election of Donald Trump, with his protectionist, anti-
immigrant and anti-tech policies, offers Europe a huge 
opportunity to take leadership. Europe has the tech talent 
to thrive, but it remains uncertain whether Europe has the 
political will to become the global digital leader.
  Recommended reading from  
CEPS research:  
  Reforming E-Communications Services:  
A Critical Assessment, March 2017
 Andrea Renda
  Unleashing Innovation and Entrepreneurship in 
Europe: People, Places and Policies, February 2017
  Jose Manuel Leceta, Andrea Renda, Totti Könnölä, and  
Felice Simonelli
  European Leadership in 5G, January 2017
 Colin Blackman and Simon Forge
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Better Regulation & Sustainable  
Development 
Better regulation: aligning policies for the 
long term
Discussion Leaders: Anne Bucher, Chair, European 
Commission Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB); Johannes 
Ludewig, Chairman, Normenkontrollrat; Céline Kauffmann, 
Deputy Head, Regulatory Policy Division, OECD; Michael 
Xuereb, Director, Regulatory Development Unit, Malta 
Financial Services Authority; Jens Hedström, Chair, Better 
Regulation working group, BusinessEurope
Moderator: Andrea Renda, Senior Research Fellow and Head 
of Regulatory Policy Unit, CEPS
National productivity boards: Old wine in old 
bottles?
Discussion Leaders: Fabrice Lenglart, Deputy Commissioner-
General, France Stratégie; Sean Dougherty, Senior Economist, 
OECD; Alessandro Turrini, Head of Macroeconomic 
Surveillance Unit, DG ECFIN, European Commission; 
Lorenzo Codogno, Professor, London School of Economics 
and Political Science; Stefano Micossi, Director General, 
Assonime, and Member of the CEPS Board
Moderator: Andrea Renda, Senior Research Fellow and Head 
of Regulatory Policy Unit, CEPS
Rebooting EU sustainability and 
decarbonisation
Discussion Leaders: Jos Delbeke, Director General, DG 
CLIMA, European Commission; Teresa Ribera, Director, IDDRI 
and former Secretary of State for Climate & Environment, 
Spain; Nicholas Ashford, Professor of Technology, MIT 
and Policy Director, Technology & Law Program; Ingeborg 
Niestroy, Associate, International Institute for Sustainable 
Development and Research Associate, Environmental Policy 
Research Centre, Free University of Berlin
Moderator: Enrico Giovannini, Professor, University of Rome 
Tor Vergata
Introduction
Better regulation does not mean more or less legislation; 
rather, it involves designing policies and rules that achieve 
their objectives at a minimum cost. Since EU policies have 
an impact on millions of citizens and companies, better 
regulation must be a pillar of EU policymaking. The current 
stage of policymaking raises two main questions: how can 
better regulation be achieved, and how can we re-align 
policies with long-term objectives?
Key points
Better regulation requires evidence-based decisions based 
on an open transparent process that involves stakeholders. 
Yet experts disagree on the most appropriate method to 
collect robust evidence. How can we ensure consistent 
methodologies that produce comparable figures? On 
transparency, EU policies may include the sources of the 
data used for policymaking, as well as information on 
whether the decision made was based on evidence. Public 
consultations allow stakeholders to express their ideas, 
concerns and perspectives on specific topics and should 
be carried out through the entire policy process. 
Aligning policies with long-term objectives is a complex 
process. First, the coherence between medium-term 
and long-term goals must be made explicit in the better 
regulation agenda. This is particularly true for environmental 
legislation. How can the EU avoid setting medium-term 
goals (i.e. for 2030) that are incompatible with the longer-
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term ones (i.e. a zero-carbon economy)? While reducing 
CO2 emissions may require investing in new low-carbon 
technology, deep decarbonisation may require re-tooling. 
Second, some concepts may need redefining, such as 
competitiveness and productivity to encompass more 
than simply market share and profits. Some rules certainly 
need to be rewritten, such as fiscal policies. Furthermore, 
sustainability will not be achieved without coherent 
economic and social agendas. Some of these policy 
changes appear as the bases for a sustainable world 
for some experts, but are too radical for policymakers 
who believe in gradual change or are constrained by the 
need to secure political consensus. The open debate on 
whether these changes should be gradual or radical further 
emphasises the complexity of aligning policies with long-
term goals. 
Moreover, the quality of EU policy depends on national 
agendas and its ultimate impact on implementation by 
national administrations, which are starkly uneven across 
member states. This is why the creation of national 
productivity boards, in charge i.a. of ensuring the smooth 
implementation of EU law at national level, could be a game 
changer if accompanied by adequate institutional design 
and powers. After the financial crisis, there was a strong 
consensus that having different productivity rates within 
the eurozone was a problem, and that it was necessary to 
realign productivity among member states. Consequently, 
in July 2016, the ECOFIN Council adopted a specific 
recommendation to establish productivity boards in every 
eurozone member country. Despite misgivings in some 
member states about the potential interference with the 
wage negotiation process, for example, or overlap with other 
national boards providing policy advice, such as the German 
Council of Economic Experts, member states will have to 
appoint a dedicated productivity board by May 2018. The 
need for a broad notion of productivity that encompasses 
the reduction of poverty and inequality and looks at social 
and environmental sustainability was emphasised during the 
debate. Likewise, adequate governance and incentives within 
the context of the European Semester are needed. Otherwise, 
there is a risk that investing new resources will replicate old 
schemes, which are doomed to remain ineffective.
Implications for policymakers
Achieving better regulation entails: collecting more accurate 
feedback on implemented EU legislation, analysing its 
distributional impacts, enhancing the involvement of all 
member states, encouraging the European Parliament and 
European Council to base their decisions on evidence and 
assess the impact of their amendments to Commission 
proposals. The European Commission could, via the 
European statistical office, share with member states 
evidence collected at EU level. This would support evidence-
based decisions at the national level, increase multilevel 
cooperation among policymakers, and should also facilitate 
the alignment of policies among member states. Aligning 
policies with long-term goals requires member states 
to share common objectives and policies. In the case of 
national productivity boards, the European Commission 
could act as a coordinator of these bodies, provide 
guidance and facilitate their work. Furthermore, with regard 
to sustainability, aligning policies with long-term goals may 
require a switch from a single focus on emissions reduction 
to a broader focus that could encompass the development 
of new materials, and of a circular economy, for example.
Special Session:  
Advancing Regional Energy Collaboration: 
Will Central & South-Eastern Europe lead the 
way?
Speakers: Ivo Prokopiev, Chairman, Alfa Finance Holding; 
Adina Crisan, Policy Coordinator, DG ENERGY, European 
Commission
Introduction
Central and South East Europe Gas Connectivity (CESEC) has 
broadened the scope of regional cooperation in Central and 
South East Europe since the High Level Group meeting in 
Budapest (September 2016). This has created new impetus 
in the region to move beyond natural gas networks to market 
coupling and electricity trading, renewables integration, energy 
efficiency policies, and the development of digital solutions.  
www.ceps.eu
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Key points
The achievements of CESEC include the creation of 
interconnectors through a limited number of infrastructure 
projects, reverse flow agreements and the implementation of 
rules to enhance connectivity. Accomplishments further include 
the prioritisation of projects, diversification of energy sources 
and routes addressing security of supply for Central and South 
East Europe, and making pipelines operational, comprising the 
development of an LNG terminal in Croatia. 
Major progress on infrastructure projects (‘hardware’) has been 
achieved, and attention is now shifting to what is frequently 
referred to as ‘software’ (i.e. rules to ensure market functioning 
- reverse flows, setting cross-border tariffs and capacity 
allocation), where significant development is being made at 
the technical level. The next steps are extending CESEC to 
electricity, renewables and energy efficiency for more energy 
security and growth.
Implications for policymakers
Regional energy cooperation is the key driver of the Energy 
Union, and should be reinforced. Solar projects could be viable 
and create value, based purely on market conditions without 
support from consumers/taxpayers, if the obstacles are 
removed. Considering the introduction of different restrictions 
on Renewable Energy Sources (RES) projects as compensation, 
the European Commission should introduce a regulation and 
make sure that RES (and solar in particular) compete on equal 
grounds with other electricity technologies. There should be no 
extra taxation for new RES projects if there is no public support 
for them, and RES should neither be privileged in grid access 
and grid connection, nor be penalised.
By creating a single European market for Guarantees of Origin 
(GOs), investors in Renewable Energy Sources could have 
new sustainable revenue streams in their projects. Storage for 
renewables should be promoted, while developing long-term 
forward contracts for electricity from RES could play a key role 
in investment decisions for new capacities. The objective of all 
regional initiatives should be the establishment of larger and 
more liquid regional energy markets.
  Recommended reading from  
CEPS research:  
  How can Sustainable Development Goals be 
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Digital energy: value chains and profits
Discussion Leaders:  Simone Mori, Executive Vice-President, 
Head of European Affairs, Enel; Eduardo Posch, Principal 
Strategist, Industry Trends, Statoil; Mark van Stiphout, 
Deputy Head of Unit, DG ENERGY, European Commission; 
Lorenzo Pupillo, Associate Senior Research Fellow, CEPS
Moderator: Geert Deconinck, Professor, KU Leuven
Climate policy and technological developments are 
increasingly driving the growth of distributed energy 
resources, but it is the combination of this innovation and the 
digitalisation of energy infrastructure that is transforming 
the energy system at an unprecedented speed. 
The decarbonisation of the energy sector cannot move 
forward without digitalisation and, more generally, 
innovation – both are required to establish a more 
integrated system. This can be done physically, by means 
of infrastructure, and through collaboration between 
companies. In this changing system, consumers are more 
at the forefront and play an increasingly active role. Supplied 
with more data, they have the opportunity to use energy 
differently, providing room for bottom-up transformation to 
accompany the current top-down approach. To make a low-
carbon digital energy system work, there is a need to build 
and operate power plants and grids that digitally balance 
the complex demand and supply response systems. Power 
generators and grids provide returns, but what value chains 
will appear and how profits will be distributed in a future 
system is still unclear. 
Digital energy carries the risk of cyber attacks, so placing 
cyber security will have in a vital central role in the energy 
system. Cyber attacks in the electricity sector has already 
been the target of cyber attacks, and are already taking 
place and energy companies are working to prevent them. 
As technology proliferates and more of our energy services 
become digitalised, cyber such attacks are become a 
growing risk. Attacks will likely persist and evolve, so 
continual investment in cyber security is imperative.
Key recommendations for policymakers include increased: 
investment in cyber security, particularly for distribution 
systems. Incentives should be directed at grid operators to 
invest in upgrading their grid infrastructure. Research also 
needs to be carried out into who should own the data in a 
digitalised energy system. Demand-side response systems 
will be a key feature of the transition and should be stimulated.
Circular economy: A real opportunity to renew 
Europe’s industry?
Discussion Leaders: Arnold Tukker, Professor, Industrial 
Ecology and Director of the Institute of Environmental 
Sciences, University of Leiden; Iben Sohn, Adviser, 
Confederation of Danish Industry; Axel Kühner, CEO, Greiner 
Group; Stef Kranendijk, Affiliate Partner, SystemiQ Ltd
Moderator: Arno Behrens, Head of Sustainable Resources 
and Senior Research Fellow, CEPS
The circular economy concept has gained currency because 
it is thought to provide a response to multiple challenges, 
including waste generation and greenhouse gas emissions, 
security of raw material supplies, and the competitiveness of 
EU industry. Yet, the transition to a circular economy is still 
at its early stages. Industry is rethinking business models 
along the entire value chain, to meet demand for goods and 
services and policy is looking into ways to facilitate this.
The discussion highlighted examples of how added value 
can be created for companies embracing circular business 
models. Innovations are often taken up by market for a host 
of different reasons, even if price differentials are low. In some 
cases companies choose to take voluntary action ahead of 
www.ceps.eu
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legislation, e.g. the voluntary agreement to extend the life 
of electronics in Denmark. Building consumer trust was 
identified as one of the key enablers to the circular economy. 
Policy proposals revolved around three main issues: 
taxation, public procurement and removing legislative 
barriers. Regarding taxation, circularity could be encouraged 
by introducing reduced tax rates for companies that have 
successfully implemented the circular economy. Similarly, 
a tax on virgin materials could accelerate recycling. Green 
Public Procurement could also increase demand, thereby 
allowing existing business models to be upscaled. Two 
regulatory barriers were addressed: the definition of 
waste and regulatory requirements, which, according to 
participants, prevent transport for recycling in other EU 
member states, and food safety regulation, which prevents 
recycling of plastics for reuse in the food industry. Another 
recommendation was the need to minimise the mix of 
materials to facilitate their sorting and recycling.
How disruptive are new urban mobility 
solutions?
Discussion Leaders: Paul Nieuwenhuis, Co-Director, Centre 
for Automotive Industry research & Electrical Vehicle Centre 
of Excellence, Cardiff University; Tapani Touru, Head of 
Transport System Planning Group, Helsinki region transport 
authority; Fabienne Weibel, Head of Public Policy, BlaBlaCar; 
Thierry Le Boucher, Deputy Senior Vice President, EDF 
R&D; Elke Bossaert, Managing Director, Mobiel 21; Agata 
Waclawik-Wejman, Head of Public Policy & Governmental 
Relations, Uber Technologies
Moderator: Christian Egenhofer, Associate Senior Research 
Fellow, Head of the Energy and Climate programme and 
Director of Energy Climate House, CEPS
This session discussed ways forward towards sustainable, 
low-carbon transport. The EU-wide objective to decarbonise 
the transport sector is driving a technological transition, 
and digital technology is enabling new trends like car sharing, 
multi-modal transport and autonomous driving. But GHG 
emissions in the EU transport sector were 20% higher in 
2014 than they were in 1990. In both cities and rural areas, 
conventional gasoline and diesel fuelled cars still predominate.
It was acknowledged that electric mobility is facing barriers 
related to business, technology and behaviour. Addressing 
the political and social inertia to reduce private car ownership 
was identified as a key policy challenge. The transport 
sector needs planning by government bodies because of 
network effects. Autonomous driving was seen as a possible 
disruption, and electrification could be driven by opposition 
to air and noise pollution, which would have a significant 
impact on the electricity sector. There is significant potential 
for car-sharing (presently only 1.7 occupants per car on 
average), particularly in short-distance car sharing. Benefits 
would include higher economic efficiency, lower emissions 
and less time spent in traffic. It could also provide social 
benefits by making mobility cheaper.
There were mixed views on the role EU policy (vs. member 
state/local policy) should play. Some agreement for more 
efficient use of the collective car fleet was reached, which 
would imply an evaluation of existing policy on car sharing. 
There remains a dilemma in the transition to electro mobility. 
Without existing electric charging/hydrogen refuelling 
infrastructure, these technologies are not able to fully 
replace conventional combustion engines. But investment 
in this infrastructure is currently risky and therefore 
scarce. It is debatable whether the EU’s technology-
neutral decarbonisation policy will be able to overcome 
this dilemma. The timely assessment of regulatory issues 
surrounding autonomous driving could allow for the rapid 
development of this technology once it gains momentum.
  Recommended reading from  
CEPS research:  
  Towards an Effective EU Framework for Road 
Transport and GHG Emissions, July 2016
  Christian Egenhofer, Andrei Marcu, Vasileios Rizos, Arno 
Behrens, Jorge Núñez Ferrer, Arndt Hassel and Milan 
Elkerbout
	 	The	Circular	Economy:	A	review	of	definitions,	
processes and impacts, April 2017
  Vasileios Rizos, Katja Tuokko and Arno Behrens
  Climate policy in 2025 - after eight years of Trump 
in the White House, December 2016
  Milan Elkerbout
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How might the UK design its own trade 
policy?
Discussion Leaders: Robert Madelin, , Chief Strategist, Fipra 
International; Roderick Abbott, Senior Adviser on trade 
policy, ECIPE
Moderator: Jacques Pelkmans, Senior Research Fellow, CEPS
Trade policy in the age of populism
Discussion Leaders: Carl B. Hamilton, former Trade 
Minister of Sweden and Special Adviser on Trade Policy 
to the EU Commissioner Cecilia Malmström; Cécile 
Toubeau, Director, Better Trade and Regulation, Transport 
& Environment
Moderator: Jacques Pelkmans, Senior Research Fellow, CEPS
Effective EU trade policy with 38 decision-
makers?
Discussion Leaders: Mauro Petriccione, Deputy Director 
General, DG TRADE, European Commission;  Marco Bronckers, 
Professor of WTO Law and European Law, Leiden University; 
Julie Bynens, General Representative of the Flemish 
Government to the EU; David Weis, Mertens Counsellor, 
Permanent Representation of Luxembourg to the EU
Moderator: Guillaume Van der Loo, Researcher, CEPS
Introduction
Anti-globalisation is on the rise, the US is turning away from 
international free trade and the UK is leaving the largest trade 
block in the world. All this calls for a new vision and a firm 
response from policymakers and trade experts. Moreover, civil 
society has become increasingly concerned about how free 
trade might impact national governments’ right to regulate 
environmental protection and labour standards. While some 
of these concerns are legitimate, some policymakers and civil 
society groups attack international trade to serve their populist 
or nationalist agenda. At EU-level an effective trade policy 
is hampered by the increasing involvement of national, and 
even regional, governments and parliaments, as evidenced by 
Wallonia’s stance in the signature of CETA. 
Key points
The UK-EU trade relationship after Brexit can become the model 
for future trade patterns. In fact, the UK’s trade policy not only 
concerns the UK and its future business with the EU, it will 
also need to deal with other players, such as Latin America, 
North America and Asia. What appears clear is that the UK 
will try to replicate (as closely as possible) the tariff and quota 
schedules it already has in place as an EU member and that 
there is currently no appropriate existing economic integration 
framework (e.g. the EEA or the Swiss ‘bilateral’ way) that would 
be acceptable and feasible for both the EU and the UK. Even 
though a mirror tariff schedule would hit both the EU and the 
UK, especially in industries with integrated supply chains (e.g. 
the car industry), it seems to be the only feasible way to reach 
agreement between the two partners and, as a consequence, to 
define future UK trade relationship with non-EU countries. The 
paradox is that Brexit supporters embrace globalisation and 
free trade, but as a sovereign state, not as an EU member.
The inclusion of new chapters in FTAs (e.g. IPR, services, 
investment (protection) and sustainable development) has 
sparked heated debate on the EU’s legitimacy to conclude these 
trade agreements. Member states argue (for example in the 
pending Opinion on the EU-Singapore FTA before the Court of 
Justice of the EU) that the new generation of FTAs goes beyond 
the scope of the EU’s exclusive Common Commercial Policy 
and that therefore these agreements should be concluded as 
www.ceps.eu
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‘mixed agreements’, requiring the ratification of all members 
states (and in Belgium even the regional parliaments) and the 
EU. Member states increasingly insist on ‘mixity’ because this 
gives them a veto in concluding these agreements. But this 
carries the risk that member states use their veto to extract 
last-minute (non trade-related) concessions, raising the 
question of how, and to what extent, member states should be 
involved in EU trade policy. How to find a fair balance between 
effectiveness and legitimacy in EU trade policy, while respecting 
the exclusive nature of the EU’s Common Commercial Policy? Is 
it democratic that a region in one member state can jeopardise 
the conclusion of an agreement for the entire EU? And is the 
provisional application of trade agreements an appropriate 
instrument to mitigate the negative effects of mixity?
Implications for policymakers
Transparent and active political engagement at all levels of EU 
decision-making are key to re-establishing public confidence 
in international trade negotiations, without dismantling 
existing procedures and competences. In fact, most of the 
negative reactions to TTIP and CETA at member state level 
only emerged during the final stages of negotiations, although 
national governments are i) constantly updated on negotiation 
outcomes and ii) have given their mandate to the European 
Commission to negotiate. Nowadays, the democratic legitimacy 
of the EU’s trade policy is ensured by the European Parliament, 
which has already shown that it is not afraid to use its new 
competences in the area of trade by, for example, rejecting the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA).  
Nonetheless, the lack of transparency perceived by citizens 
is driven by a soft engagement of both national and regional 
governments during the early stages of negotiations. Hence, 
it is a duty of these authorities to engage seriously throughout 
the entire negotiation process via the Trade Policy Committee, 
not only when it comes to the signature and ratification of 
the agreement. Moreover, national governments should also 
engage in a serious and constructive political debate with their 
national and regional parliaments and civil society before giving 
the mandate to the Commission for future negotiations on 
FTAs. 
Splitting FTAs based upon different competences (i.e. 
separating the elements falling under EU competences from 
those falling under member state competences into two 
agreements) might work as a temporary solution, but it would 
certainly weaken EU decision-making and negotiating power in 
the long run. Moreover, in light of Brexit, when the EU will have 
to negotiate one of the most important FTAs in its history, the 
Commission’s negotiating power must be stronger than ever. 
Concerns, enquiries and special interests from national and 
regional authorities about the future trade relationship with 
the UK must be clearly defined at the start of the negotiations. 
Only with a deep and well-defined understanding of both 
European and British interests will it be possible to put in place a 
comprehensive agreement that will limit the losses from Brexit 
for both sides.
  Recommended reading from  
CEPS research:  
  An Assessment of the Economic Impact of Brexit 
on the EU27, March 2017
  Michael Emerson, Matthias Busse, Mattia Di Salvo, 
Daniel Gros and Jacques Pelkmans
  Does Wallonia’s veto of CETA spell the beginning  
of the end of EU trade policy?, October 2016
  Guillaume Van der Loo and Jacques Pelkmans
  EU-China Leadership in Trade Policy: Feasible? 
Desirable?, March 2017
  Weinian Hu and Jacques Pelkmans 
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Will banks survive the age of digitalisation?
Discussion Leaders: Alvaro Martin, Head Economist, 
Digital Regulation, BBVA Research; Michael Stephan, COO 
& Founder, Raisin; Olivier de Groote, Managing Partner 
Financial Services Industry, Deloitte, Belgium
Moderator: Sylvain Bouyon, Research Fellow, CEPS
While banks have had difficult years since the crisis, with 
poor financial results and significant deterioration in 
consumer trust, restructuring and regulatory intervention 
have helped them to recover. One of the current 
challenges for banks is the low interest rate environment. 
By contributing to cut operational costs, digitalisation 
has been seen as a potential response to this particular 
challenge. Nevertheless, in coping with the difficulties in 
their digital transformation, banks need to question many 
aspects of their business models: ICT systems, tax systems, 
internal human organisation, etc. In this respect, there are 
some serious legacy issues that need to be overcome. In 
order to be competitive and improve customer services by 
increasing speed and accuracy, many systems need to be 
radically reshaped. This transformation requires new skills 
that banks generally do not have themselves and which are 
fairly difficult to acquire.
Conversely, new entrants such as Fintech startups have no 
legacy issues, resulting in short lines and high flexibility in 
their decision-making process. Banks know how to spot the 
FinTech startups they need to acquire or collaborate with 
in order to support their digital transformation, but often 
prove unsuccessful in integrating them efficiently. Potential 
new entrants such as GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook 
and Amazon) have some advantages and might be able 
to target some attractive niche markets; however, if they 
decide to deploy significant resources to enter the banking 
market, they will have to address the issues related to the 
multiplicity of banking rules. 
Against that background, it is still not clear if policies will 
end up protecting banks in their digital transformation 
rather than favouring new market players. Overall, whereas 
policymakers need to continuously address specific risks 
related to consumer protection and financial stability, they 
also need to ensure that providers have sufficient room to 
innovate constantly. In that respect, the use of regulatory 
frameworks such as sandboxes can help supervisors better 
monitor the innovation dynamics in financial services, 
especially by being informed of new products much more 
in advance. To conclude, although the real future impact of 
technologies such as blockchain seems to be difficult to 
predict, questions can be raised about how such technology 
could lessen the compliance burden.
Implementing the new regime: bail-in and 
systemic risk
Discussion Leaders:  Nadège Jassaud, Head of Unit for 
Resolution Strategy and Cooperation, Single Resolution 
Board; José María Roldán, Chairman and CEO, Spanish 
Banking Association and Vice President, European Banking 
Federation; Philippe Lamberts, MEP, and member of the 
ECON Committee
Moderator: Willem Pieter de Groen, Research Fellow, CEPS
This Lab session assessed the challenges for the 
resolution regime, which is the main novelty in the post-
crisis regulatory and supervisory financial architecture in 
the EU. The resolution framework must ensure that banks 
and supervisors are, on the one hand, better prepared for 
www.ceps.eu
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resolution. On the other hand, that the losses will be wound 
down on the bank creditors through a bail-in rather than on 
taxpayers, as was the case during the crisis. 
The resolution mechanism is still a work in progress 
on various fronts. Although the mechanism is already 
operational, the resolution authorities are still working on 
drafting the resolution plans and the banks are still in a 
transition phase to close the €100 billion gap in minimum 
required bail-inable liabilities (MREL). There are, however, 
some more structural issues that still need to be addressed 
to make also the resolution of mid-sized and large banks 
credible. Currently there are no provisions establishing who 
may hold bail-inable liabilities, which may mean that some 
creditors who are supposed to be bail-inable prove not to 
be so after all (e.g. some retail clients, other banks). There 
is also no back-up facility if the resolution fund proves 
insufficient. Moreover, the required liquidity provisioning 
is only implicitly arranged through the existing Emergency 
Liquidity Assistance (ELA) facility of the central banks, 
which is officially only available for solvent institutions with 
a liquidity shortage.
Several policy and supervisory measures were proposed 
to improve the functioning of the resolution mechanism 
and enhance the credibility of the resolution mechanism. 
The sales of bail-inable liabilities might, for instance, be 
restricted to ‘sophisticated’ investors that are able to assess 
and diversify the risks (e.g. pension funds, insurers). In 
order to improve the ability of those investors to determine 
the riskiness of the bail-inable liabilities, the resolution 
authorities and/or the banks should consider disclosing at 
least part of the resolution plans. The European Stability 
Mechanism could function as a backstop for the resolution 
fund. Finally, the liquidity issues could be addressed with 
a special ELA facility established exclusively for the banks 
that are being resolved. 
Strategic Investments and Development Banks
Discussion Leaders:  Benjamin Angel, Director, Treasury and 
Financial Operations, European Commission and member of 
the Steering Board, European Fund for Strategic Investments; 
Iliyana Tsanova, Deputy Managing Director, European Fund 
for Strategic Investments, European Investment Bank; 
Debora Revoltella, Director, SG Economics Department, 
European Investment Bank
Moderator: Karel Lannoo, Chief Executive Officer, CEPS
This session focused on three issues: i) the overall 
performance of the European Fund for Strategic Investment 
(EFSI) since its creation two and a half years ago, ii) 
the interaction of EFSI with the private sector and the 
banking sector, and how this can be improved and iii) the 
macroeconomic impact of EFSI, particularly on investment 
in the EU. 
Since summer 2015, when EFSI was officially launched, 
more than 400 projects have been approved in 28 member 
states, leveraging 54% of the full €315 billion envisaged. 
Due to this significant performance, investment in the 
EU is picking up and recovering, as a recent survey by 
the EIB reveals. This is happening in a very uneven way 
among countries, asset classes and firm size, however, for 
a number of reasons. The distribution of funds is mainly 
concentrated towards old member states and only 8% is 
being channelled towards new member states. There is 
a general lack of transparency and understanding about 
how EFSI works. More focus should be placed on climate 
change (green finance and sustainable investments) and 
SMEs, while the cooperation between EFSI (EC and EIB) and 
the local financing institutions, and the local development 
banks, needs to be improved. Nevertheless, financial 
instruments will not change the market overnight. The right 
balance between traditional activities (i.e. infrastructure 
and climate) and new financial instruments is crucial. What 
matters is the quality rather than the quantity of capital and 
how to motivate technological shifts and innovation.
Finance
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   Philippe Lamberts, Nadège Jassaud, Willem Pieter De Groen
There were several important recommendations to 
further improve and strengthen investment within the 
EU. For example, to incorporate more private investors, 
one recommendation was to slice projects into senior 
(triple- or double-A rating) and junior tranches, to allow 
development banks to invest in the former, while private 
investors could invest in the latter. The development of 
public-private partnerships could also be a way forward, 
but public opinion does not always support these initiatives 
(i.e. the state selling its assets), while investors don’t want 
to own the assets, only to invest in them. Better education 
of the general public on PPPs and their effect on Europe’s 
economy could also be helpful. Finally, more work is needed 
to finance SMEs, especially on the maturity of lending and 
on collateral requirements.
  Recommended reading from  
CEPS research:  
  The Future of Retail Financial Services: What  
policy mix for a balanced digital transformation?, 
February 2017
  Sylvain Bouyon
  European Bank Resolution: Making it work!,  
January 2016
  Thomas Huertas
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Economy 
The ECB’s unconventional policies: Time to 
declare victory and get out?
Discussion Leaders: Markus Brunnermeier, Professor, 
Princeton University; Massimo Rostagno, Director, Monetary 
Policy, ECB; Frederik Ducrozet, Senior Economist Europe, 
Pictet Wealth Management
Moderator: Marek Belka, former Prime Minister and Governor, 
Central Bank of Poland
EMU governance: a reality check
Discussion Leaders: Pierre Moscovici, Member of the 
European Commission with responsibility for Economic and 
Financial Affairs; Niels Thygesen, Chairman of the European 
Fiscal Board; Mario Vella, Governor, Central Bank of Malta
Moderator: Olli Rehn, Member of the Board, Central Bank of 
Finland
What is the biggest risk facing EMU?
Discussion Leaders: George Papaconstantinou, former 
Greek Finance Minister; Katinka Barysch, Director of Political 
Relations, Allianz SE; Reza Moghadam, Vice-Chairman for 
Global Capital Markets, Morgan Stanley
Moderator: Aart De Geus, President and CEO, Bertelsmann 
Stiftung
Introduction
The acute phase of the euro crisis is thought to be over 
but, according to many experts, the present framework and 
economic trends in the EMU are not economically, politically 
or socially sustainable. Eurozone economic growth remains 
sluggish and unemployment in some member states is still 
high. At the same time, the debt-to-GDP ratio has risen to 
over 90% in the eurozone. One reason why it remains difficult 
to reduce debt levels is the low inflation rate, which despite 
ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary 
policies, has not rebounded because the core inflation 
rate is still significantly short of the (close to) 2% target. 
Uncertainty about the future of the EU seems to be a big 
factor. This undesirable and unsustainable status quo raises 
the following questions: how to reform the EMU’s governance 
structure? What are the biggest threats to the EMU? How can 
we increase the EMU’s resilience to future shocks? How/when 
to return to a ‘normal’ monetary policy stance?
Key points
Initial discussions dealt with the role of the ECB, in 
particular how and when to exit QE and raise interest rates. 
Two interesting points arose during the discussions. The 
first concerned the ECB’s inflation forecasting: why should 
we trust current favourable forecasts when in the past they 
often turned out to vastly overestimate future inflation? Lab 
participants argued that the upward bias in forecasting 
models was due to uncertainty about underlying economic 
issues, which often turned out to be more severe than 
assumed. Some thought that reality might now improve, 
getting closer to the rosier forecasting scenarios. Some 
participants argued that the ECB’s projections also face 
political constraints, as they have to convey confidence in 
the bank’s ability to control inflation.
Participants further engaged in a heated debate on the 
ECB’s exit strategy from quantitative easing (QE). Two main 
options were discussed: the first, and presumably safest, 
option is to hold all purchased bonds to maturity and react 
to inflationary pressure by using conventional monetary 
policy, i.e. increasing the ECB’s key interest rates. The second 
option would be to ‘undo QE’ by gradually selling off bonds, 
   Olli Rehn, Pierre Moscovici, Niels Thygesen & Mario Vella
18
which would reduce the ECB’s currently large balance sheet. 
This could be done by selling off sovereign bond holdings as 
ESBies (European Safe Bonds) and EJBies (European Junior 
Bonds) which would be fully collateralised by the underlying 
portfolio of bonds held by the national central banks.
Participants agreed, however, that even such supportive 
actions would not suffice without a reform of the EMU 
governance framework. 
Exactly how to complete the EMU architecture was the 
subject of lively debate. The notion of the ‘impossibility 
quadrangle’ was raised, as the ideal EMU governance 
system has to be simple, automatic, economically efficient, 
and politically sustainable. The feasibility of designing a 
system to meet all four criteria is doubtful. What could be the 
best compromise? Participants agreed that both clear rules 
and strong institutions are necessary for the ‘second to ideal’ 
governance framework. While rules guide the actions of 
policymakers by setting specific goals, institutions guarantee 
the implementation of these rules, ensure constructive 
dialogue within EMU, and allow for necessary flexibility. How 
to balance clear and enforced rules with offering flexibility 
could not be resolved as there was strong disagreement 
about how one should take centre stage in the EMU.
If there is no agreement on how to move forward, we are 
likely to be stuck in a muddling-through policy approach, 
which carries substantial political risk. The experts 
acknowledged that while several economic risks threaten 
EMU, none is comparable to the political risks embodied by 
the recent rise of populism. 
Part of the population feels that the introduction of the 
euro has led to divergence rather than convergence in 
the eurozone, and they link austerity to the euro. Yet we 
also know that almost 70% of the eurozone citizens feel 
somehow ‘attached’ to the euro. The euro promised to 
bring stability to member states, which it has only partly 
delivered. The ‘EMU delivery gap’ was thus pinpointed as 
one of the biggest risks to the EMU. 
One topic kept resurfacing: how to better showcase the 
benefits of being in the EMU? One argument was to allow 
for more democracy and transparency in macroeconomic 
surveillance as a further step to improving EMU governance. 
Having a stronger voice during joint decision-making might 
increase the willingness of smaller member states to comply 
with decisions and, thus, improve implementation. The need 
to enhance national ownership to increase support for and 
the legitimacy of the EMU was underlined, as was the need 
for further integration to enhance the resilience of the EMU.
Implications for policymakers
Communicating the ECB’s exit strategy from QE is a sensitive 
issue, requiring great care and confidence. Both the timing 
and modalities of exit are crucial: gradually scaling down 
asset purchases and simply holding bonds to maturity – 
with its only main downside of creating a temporary safe 
bond scarcity – appears to be the safest choice. Despite 
lacking a clear counterfactual, it seems likely that the ECB’s 
asset purchase programme has delivered its objectives 
and unconventional monetary policies will remain a policy 
option in the future. 
There is a need to strike a balance between decentralisation 
and centralisation pressures. Addressing the disconnect 
between EU policymakers and member states emerged as 
a crucial challenge to be overcome to create the political 
pre-conditions for further integration. One key proposal was 
to reinforce exchanges between national parliaments and 
the EU parliament.
As regards economic risks, speakers underlined that further 
risk mutualisation among member states is essential to 
ensure the resilience of the euro area, but this would also 
require risk reduction to stem moral hazard.
  Recommended reading from  
CEPS research:  
  Is there a need for additional monetary stimulus? 
Insights from the original Taylor Rule, April 2016
  Cinzia Alcidi, Matthias Busse and Daniel Gros
  Structural reforms as a panacea? The European 
Productivity and Growth Puzzle, December 2016
 Daniel Gros
  Ultra-low or Negative Yields on Euro-Area Long-
term Bonds: Causes and Implications for  
Monetary Policy, September 2016
 Daniel Gros
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Social Europe
Is the Youth Guarantee a waste of time and 
money?
Discussion Leaders: Jacqueline O’Reilly, Professor, University 
of Brighton; Selma Mahfouz, Director, Research and 
Statistics, Ministry of Employment and Social Dialogue, 
France; Massimiliano Mascherini, Research Manager, 
Employment and Change Unit, Eurofound
Moderator: Miroslav Beblavý, Associate Senior Research 
Fellow, CEPS
Youth unemployment has been prominent on the EU policy 
agenda since the Great Recession, which in many member 
states had a particularly strong impact on the younger 
generation. In 2017, one decade after the outbreak of the 
crisis, millions of young citizens are still not in employment, 
education or training (NEET). To address this important 
issue, the EU launched the Youth Guarantee in 2013. The 
Youth Guarantee is not a single European policy, it is a 
combination of national programmes that commit member 
states to ensure that all young people under the age of 
25 receive a good quality offer of employment, continued 
education, apprenticeship or traineeship. As Europe is now 
starting to recover from the crisis, we might ask whether 
the Youth Guarantee has made any mark, which is also 
important for the legitimacy of the EU.  
One concern put forward in the debate is that the Youth 
Guarantee is too little, too late, as insufficient funds were 
provided to have a big impact and it was only launched in 
2013. It resembles earlier policies, like old wine in a new 
bottle. Not all member states actually took measures to 
tackle the issue of youth unemployment according to 
the guidelines of the Youth Guarantee, which, it has been 
argued, are prohibitively bureaucratic. 
Another issue related to quality and expectations: as member 
states struggle to provide every eligible young person with 
an opportunity, the quality of opportunities offered may go 
down. At the same time, the expectations that youngsters 
have of these opportunities may not correspond to reality. 
Many, for example, hope for a job opportunity but end 
up with an internship or in education instead. The Youth 
Guarantee has not so far been an effective lever to encourage 
further improvements in national policies or to strengthen 
public employment services. Despite these issues, or maybe 
because of them, the Youth Guarantee has placed NEETS at 
the centre of the European policy debate. Moreover, when 
sufficiently targeted and taking gender, ethnicity and sectoral 
differences into account, it may actually be quite effective, as 
illustrated in France, where the specific focus on youngsters 
who were very far from the labour market led to its success. 
Interestingly, the consensus reached in the debate was that 
abolishing the Youth Guarantee is not a viable option. There 
was instead a plea for continuity in this policy domain, which 
is subject to frequent changes that affect a particularly 
vulnerable group. The measures should also be studied to 
understand their long-term impact. Engaging employers 
with labour market policies like the Youth Guarantee was 
seen as an essential step for the future; setting the right 
incentives for national policymakers and other stakeholders 
may prove to be vital.
Are social partners still relevant?
Discussion Leaders: Esther Lynch, Confederal Secretary, 
European Trade Union Confederation; Marco Torregrossa, 
Secretary General, European Forum of Independent 
Professionals; Guglielmo Meardi, Director, Industrial 
Relations Research Unit, University of Warwick; Laurens 
Harteveld, Advisor on Labour Conditions, AWVN
Moderator: Frank Vandenbroucke, Professor, University of 
Amsterdam
    Selma Mahfouz, Miroslav Beblavý, Massimiliano Mascherini &  
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Social partners’ capacity to reach compromises on issues 
on which employers and employees hold opposing views 
has allowed them to take up powerful positions in society, 
as evidenced by their role in collective bargaining on 
wages and working conditions, which have affected the 
lives of millions. Against the backdrop of the economic 
crisis, Europe’s labour markets are once again undergoing 
significant changes, this time driven by digitalisation 
and technological progress. As existing jobs disappear 
or are being significantly transformed, social partners 
may play a critical role in ensuring that the benefits of 
these advancements are reaped, while protecting those 
most affected. Nevertheless, trade union membership 
is in sharp decline and similar trends are reported for 
employer representatives. At the same time, new forms of 
representation have emerged. This raises the question of 
whether traditional social partners are still relevant.
Consensus quickly emerged that the social partners are 
still likely to play a major role for the foreseeable future. 
Yet, while the world around them is changing, social 
partners do not seem to have changed much: take-up of 
new digital technologies seems to be rather limited despite 
their potential, notably as one of the best ways to organise 
collective action. Similarly, while some unions allow the 
self-employed to join, most have maintained their focus on 
employees. Social partners thus struggle to keep pace with 
labour market change. 
The discussion also touched on the collaborative economy, 
the status of those who work through an online platform 
and the responsibilities of the platforms. The case of UK 
Deliveroo workers receiving assistance from the trade 
unions when faced with difficulties is an interesting one. 
Online platforms may be disruptive forces, but more 
research on their impact is needed. Similarly, their approach 
to social protection cannot be at the expense of their 
business models.
Traditional social partners need to engage more with 
new organisations or new forms of representation, to find 
common solutions and to reach compromises – thereby 
fulfilling their usual role. Digitalisation will inevitably affect 
the role of the social partners, and newly available data, 
methods and tools may radically change the way collective 
bargaining and industrial relations are conducted. In that 
sense, if platforms could share their data in real time with 
social partners this would allow further transparency and 
collaboration. Despite increasing attention being given to 
these issues, whether the social partners are ready for this 
change is an open question; unions need to ‘think outside 
the box’.
What is already clear is that policymakers need to level the 
playing field between the different labour market actors 
to ensure that the same rules and regulations apply to 
traditional and new types of social partners. It was also 
mentioned that the EU has a role to play, particularly in 
protecting transnational rights.
What to do about the failure to integrate 
refugees into the labour market?
CEPS	gratefully	acknowledges	financial	support	from	
MEDAM for this Lab. 
Discussion Leaders: Herbert Brücker, Professor, Institute 
for Employment Research, Nürnberg; Jelena Drenjanin, 
Member of the Municipal Council, Huddinge, Sweden; Yonous 
Muhammadi, Director, Greek Forum of Refugees
Moderator: Mehtap Akgüç, Research Fellow, CEPS
As evidenced by high unemployment rates, the labour 
market integration of refugees is a challenge and the 
recent refugee crisis has made integration a point on the 
agenda. On the one hand, host-country citizens are worried 
that newcomers will take their jobs or live on welfare 
benefits without contributing to social security systems, 
and these fears are being fuelled by populist discourse. On 
the other hand, quite apart from humanitarian concerns, 
refugee inflows could present an opportunity in the context 
of ageing societies, a shrinking labour force and skill 
shortages. More importantly, labour market integration 
is a prerequisite for social integration. To this end, there 
have been several initiatives to better integrate refugees 
into labour markets, focusing on skills and qualification 
recognition and investment in destination country language 
skills. However, it is not clear whether these measures are 
enough to overcome the barriers that refugees face in the 
labour market. 
It takes refugees longer than migrants to integrate into 
the labour market, but that does not necessarily mean 
failure; there seems to be a consensus that legal clarity 
www.ceps.eu
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is a condition sine qua non for labour market integration. 
Long asylum processes keep people out of the labour 
markets, as does a lack of host-country language skills. 
Learning the host-country language is especially effective 
when combined with business programmes (e.g. internship 
or on-the-job-training). Yet evidence shows that there is a 
problem of supply for language courses for refugees. 
Another issue relates to educational attainment. Evidence 
shows that although refugees lack human capital, and 
have had very little vocational training, their educational 
aspirations are high. Several initiatives have been put 
forward to integrate them into schools and universities, 
but more investment is needed for refugees to complete 
their education. Another obstacle arises from inefficient 
matching in the labour market. Most refugees find 
jobs through friends or family members in the ‘migrant 
economy’ of cleaning and hotel services etc. - the public 
employment services are not always efficient or able to 
provide the right support. 
Race discrimination is another significant hindering factor in 
the integration process and does not receive enough attention. 
Gender was also brought up: women face greater difficulties to 
participate in labour markets and their integration takes longer 
than men. At the same time, female refugees have skills that 
could be useful for destination countries but these women are 
not aware of the demand in labour markets. Finally, residence 
obligations often hinder better integration outcomes and can 
create lock-in effects for refugees.
Considering these various aspects, one of the policy 
recommendations relates to the important role that local 
and regional public authorities play in the integration 
process, as they have links with both employers, businesses, 
local administration and refugees; in other words, they are 
more aware of the local situation. To this end, tailor-made 
contextual programmes connected with employers should 
be encouraged. Combining immediate access to labour 
markets with training, life-long learning and further education 
possibilities seems to be a very efficient approach as well, 
especially considering that those working in professions 
for they were trained tend to be more productive in their 
jobs. Technology is also important: given the low level of 
digitalisation in the public sector, further efficiencies could 
be achieved by using technologically advanced tools for the 
successful integration of refugees into labour markets.
  Recommended reading from  
CEPS research:  
  Are student workers crowding out the low-skilled 
youth?, 2015
  Miroslav Beblavý, Brian Fabo, Lucia Mýtna Kureková  
and Zuzana Žilinčíková
  Five things we need to know about the on-demand 
economy, January 2016
  Ilaria Maselli, Karolien Lenaerts and Miroslav Beblavý
  Labour market integration of refugees: A 
comparative	survey	of	Bosnians	in	five	EU	
countries, December 2016
  Mikkel Barslund, Matthias Busse, Karolien Lenaerts,  
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The EU asylum system: Time to move beyond 
the Dublin logic?
Discussion Leaders: Henrik Nielsen, Head of Unit for Border 
Management and Return Policy, DG HOME, European 
Commission; Jean-Pierre Schembri, Head of Communications 
& Stakeholders Unit, European Asylum Support Office (EASO); 
Sophie Magennis, Head of the Policy and Legal Support Unit, 
UNHCR; Anneliese Baldaccini, Executive Officer, Asylum and 
Migration, Amnesty International
Moderator: Sergio Carrera, Head of Justice and Home Affairs 
Programme, CEPS
Introduction
The main focus of this session was the future of the EU’s 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS), and whether 
the lessons of the past two years could tell us anything 
about the future. This relates to experiences with hotspots 
in Italy and Greece and the relocation scheme for those 
in need of international protection. The recasting of the 
Dublin Regulation was discussed as the major controversial 
element in the current proposals for CEAS reform.
Key points
The common understanding that there is a lack of solidarity 
and that the number of asylum seekers in the EU is in principle 
manageable does not translate into common ideas on how 
to move forward. Some argued that both the relocation 
mechanism and the Dublin principle of first country of entry 
are premised on the coercion of asylum seekers, and fail to 
take into account their preferences and ties. Others argued that 
the ‘hotspots’ and relocation mechanisms do provide a basis 
to build upon for the future, and that a radical reform of the 
Dublin logic towards more preference-matching is unrealistic. 
The role of the new EU Agency for Asylum – now the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO) was discussed; this agency 
has already been active in Greece and Italy in the hotspots, 
supporting relocation and the Greek asylum procedures. Under 
Commission proposals, it will have a greater role in Country of 
Origin information and more human resources at its disposal. 
Discussions also focused on cooperation with third countries, 
such as Turkey. Several participants argued that the ‘deal’ is 
problematic, in particular its assumption that Turkey is a ‘safe 
third country’ and the resulting policy of deeming asylum 
requests made in Greece inadmissible.
Implications for policymakers
The current legal and operational state of affairs is not 
satisfactory, either for asylum seekers or for member states. 
The Dublin rules are not producing effective responsibility-
sharing. How we can build a CEAS that delivers reception 
conditions and asylum procedures that comply with the 
rule of law across EU member states? The new EU Agency 
for Asylum can play a major role in delivering such a 
system. Although some stressed that the current political 
climate would not accommodate a fundamental overhaul 
of the Dublin logic, others proposed concrete ideas for 
improvement, such as the mutual recognition of positive 
asylum decisions in the Schengen Information System, 
which would allow those granted asylum to move to other 
countries rather than wait for five years in the country where 
asylum is granted. EU institutions and agencies should use 
all tools available to promote an EU rule-of-law-compliant 
CEAS, which would address the structural disparities across 
the EU, monitor and address national developments that 
challenge compliance with the rule of law, both by providing 
(financial) incentives for compliance and by being assertive 
with infringement procedures where necessary.
EU migration policies: Are there effective 
ways to address smuggling?
Discussion Leaders:  Hon. Ian Borg, MP, Parliamentary Secretary 
for the EU 2017 Presidency, Government of Malta; Agnieszka 
Sternik, Policy Officer, Unit C1: Irregular migration and Return, DG 
HOME; Brian Donald, Head of the Office of the Director, EUROPOL; 
Regina Catrambone, Co-Founder and Director of Migrant Offshore 
Aid Station-MOAS; Michele LeVoy, Director of PICUM, Platform for 
International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants




There has been increasing priority given to anti-smuggling 
policies across Europe and beyond, especially in direct 
response to the surge in asylum seekers via Greece and the 
Balkans in 2015-16, the so-called ‘refugee crisis’. The EU 
institutions – including the Commission – have cited this as 
a primary policy objective and several EU operations in the 
Mediterranean have identified ‘fighting’ smuggling as their goal. 
This session took stock of the EU’s legal, political and operational 
anti-smuggling actions, particularly the consequences of these 
actions for search and rescue (SAR) and the relationship to legal 
pathways to access asylum in Europe.
Key points
All agreed that smuggling is not a desirable way for 
individuals to reach Europe. It often takes place via 
unsafe routes, exacerbates individuals’ vulnerability and 
is sometimes used for profit by groups engaged in other 
criminal activities. At the same time, it was noted that 
smuggling has always existed, often supported by ordinary 
citizens who offer humanitarian assistance. Smuggling 
often constitutes the only way for people to reach a place of 
safety or to seek better opportunities. Viewpoints diverged 
on how to address the challenges of smuggling; for example 
how to understand the link between SAR and smuggling. 
The numbers of lives lost in the Mediterranean have soared 
in recent years. Some argue that more SAR activities have 
led to more dangerous smuggling routes, while others point 
to the lack of safe legal routes as the major explanation for 
smuggling activities.
Implications for policymakers 
EU institutions and agencies are making anti-smuggling 
policies a priority. The discussions showed that this 
should not, however, be a goal in itself without addressing 
the underlying causes and unintended consequences of 
smuggling. The drivers of smuggling should be better 
examined and addressed, and alternative safe legal routes 
for people to reach Europe should be developed, both for 
seeking asylum as well as for labour market opportunities. 
From a criminal justice perspective, cross-border crimes 
are to be investigated and prosecuted, while ensuring that 
humanitarian assistance to individuals is not hampered. The 
key question for the coming years is how EU anti-smuggling 
policies can move beyond the logic of the immediate 
responses to the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ and develop and 
implement evidence-based approaches that address the 
underlying causes and human costs of smuggling.
Who owns privacy law? Enforcement in the 
tussle between the EU and the US
Discussion Leaders:  Jennifer Daskal, Associate Professor, 
American University Washington College of Law; Michael 
Olmsted, Senior Counsel for the EU and International Criminal 
Matters, US Department of Justice; Florence Raynal, Deputy 
Director and Head of the European and International Affairs 
Department, Commission Nationale Informatique & Libertés; 
Bruno Gencarelli, Head of the International Data Flows 
and Protection Unit, DG JUST, European Commission; Matt 
Cagle, Technology and Civil Liberties Policy Attorney, ACLU 
of Northern California
Moderator: Valsamis Mitsilegas, Professor of European 
Criminal Law, Dean for Research and Head of the Department 
of Law, Queen Mary University London
Introduction
The need to use data in the prosecution of crime arises 
from the widespread digitalisation of our daily lives. Law 
enforcement authorities are increasing their demands to 
access the personal information produced, processed and 
stored in the servers of private companies. The transnational 
dimension of internet activities poses a number of challenges 
for law enforcement agencies and judicial authorities 
operating on both sides of the Atlantic and raises questions 
about data privacy, in particular, who owns it?
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Key points
Two different concepts of privacy emerged. In the US, the 
assumption is that electronic information (including travel, 
user and content data) constitutes ‘electronic footprints’ 
to be made available to investigators. In the EU, however, 
the concept is based on the principle that ‘privacy follows 
your data’. To prevent and solve the legal conflicts that 
arise from the extraterritorial application of different legal 
regimes, transatlantic cooperation is governed by the EU-
US ‘Umbrella Agreement’ on data protection.
The legal realities on both sides of the Atlantic are 
more nuanced, however, and cannot be expressed as a 
dichotomy in which the EU only prioritises privacy and the 
US champions security. Both the EU and the US are dealing 
with the same questions in a rapidly changing societal 
and technological context. Agreeing on common rules is 
therefore essential.
Implications for policymakers 
On the EU side, the general data protection Regulation is 
currently under discussion. It will provide the baseline 
for future cooperation in the framework of transatlantic 
relations. The new internal rules set out by the upcoming 
regulation have in fact been developed with attempts made 
to clarify how data transfers should work between the EU 
and the US. These attempts have resulted in the adoption 
of the EU-US Privacy Shield (Commission Implementing 
Decision 2016/1250).
The EU-US dialogue should be inspired by transparency 
and information sharing, also in the form of reciprocal 
‘explanations’. At the same time, concerns were expressed 
in relation to a series of legal, jurisprudential and policy 
developments, occurring especially in the US. First, US law 
enforcement authorities are increasingly using electronic 
surveillance for the purposes of national security. Most 
recently, an Executive Order has been issued by the new US 
administration that excludes a number of non-US nationals 
from the protection granted under the Privacy Act. Second, 
the CJEU has shown its global ambitions to redefine 
the boundaries and reduce the ambiguities between the 
domains of privacy, law enforcement and national security. It 
is expected that the Court will intervene in the interpretation 
of how the ‘privacy shield’ should be implemented. 
Overall, accessing electronic data for law enforcement 
purposes involves sensitive and complex legal and 
procedural issues. There are particular difficulties regarding 
the need to identify criteria and connecting factors between 
whichever jurisdiction is the establishing one. It is all the 
more important that both across the Union and in relations 
with the US, law enforcement authorities cooperate in ways 
that are efficient and that respect the EU’s rule of law and 
fundamental rights standards.
Special Session:  
Solidarity and the ‘Refugee Crisis’- 
Perspectives from Central and Eastern Europe
Speakers: Vladimir Simonak, Head of Unit on Asylum, 
Immigration, Integration, Readmission and Free Movement, 
Permanent Representation of the Slovak Republic to the EU; 
Maciej Duszczyk, Associate Professor, University of Warsaw; 
Márta Pardavi, Co-Chair, Hungarian Helsinki Committee; 
Karolína Babická, Legal Advisor, International Commission 
of Jurists
Moderator: Leonhard den Hertog, Research Fellow at 
Justice and Home Affairs Programme, CEPS
Introduction
The ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015 brought to the forefront the 
divisions between EU newcomers from Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs) and the EU15 member states. 
In the heat of the crisis, the CEECs’ governments challenged 
the adequacy of EU responses in distributing responsibility 
over asylum seekers. In particular, the CEECs challenged 
the obligatory relocation key, which came with a financial 
penalty of €250,000 for each refused person, and responded 
in various ways. For example, the Hungarian authorities 
erected fences at their external border and pushed asylum 
seekers back to Serbia, as an operational response. And 
as a political response, the Slovak presidency introduced 
‘efficient solidarity’ to shift the focus from refugee protection 
to enhanced cooperation on returns. 
Key points
What kind of European solidarity is needed in the field of 
the Common European Asylum System, or indeed what 
kind of solidarity is the EU capable of showing, with all its 
institutional constraints?  
At the core of the political debate in CEECs is the question 
of balance between border security and human rights. The 
Schengen Borders Code is clear that the two elements 
are indivisible. In Hungary, however, where the ‘security 
approach’ prevails in the form of blanket push-backs of 
asylum seekers and a lack of registrations, evidence shows 
that not only human rights but also security standards 
seem to have been bypassed.  
Implications for policymakers 
The Commission should be stricter in applying its rule of 
law and fundamental rights standards for CEECs. EU-
level monitoring is needed, as proposed by the European 
Parliament in its Resolution of 25 October 2016 on the 
establishment of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule 
of law and fundamental rights. The Commission should 
verify compliance with the Schengen Borders Code and 
whether border controls are being implemented without 
prejudice to the right to asylum. The EU’s Solidarity and 
Relocation mechanism should have clear procedures 
and adequate safeguards for its required level of funding. 
EU neighbourhood countries should be partners in the 
EU’s refugee and migration policies, but not used to shift 
responsibilities from EU member states. For example, 
Serbia is accommodating the outcome of the closed Balkan 
route and push-backs by EU member states. There should 
be more safe and legal channels to reach the EU for asylum 
seekers and migrants, and the Commission should promote 
positive practices of refugee integration in cities, including 
those at CEECs.
  Recommended reading from  
CEPS research:  
  Can the new refugee relocation system work?  
Perils	in	the	Dublin	logic	and	flawed	reception	
conditions in the EU, October 2015
 Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild
  The European Border and Coast Guard:  
Addressing migration and asylum challenges in  
the Mediterranean?, February 2017
  Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans, Jean-Pierre 
Cassarino, Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild  
  Access to Electronic Data by Third-Country Law 
Enforcement Authorities: Challenges to EU Rule  
of Law and Fundamental Rights, July 2015
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Political Commission or guardian of the 
treaties?
Discussion Leaders: Catherine Barnard, Professor, University 
of Cambridge; Jim Cloos, Deputy Director-General, General 
Secretariat of the Council of the European Union; Sylvia 
Hartleif, Leader, Foreign Policy Team, European Political 
Strategy Centre
Moderator: Tom Nuttall, Charlemagne Columnist, The 
Economist
Judicial activism: Is the EU losing its last 
communitarian anchor?
Discussion Leaders:   Giuliano Amato, Judge, Constitutional 
Court of Italy and Professor, European University Institute; 
Franklin Dehousse, Professor, University of Liège and former 
Judge, EU Court of Justice
Moderator: Deirdre Curtin, Professor, European University 
Institute
The squeeze on the political centre: What 
impact on the EU?
Discussion Leaders: Heather Grabbe, Director, Open Society 
European Policy Institute; Ulrike Guérot, Director, European 
Democracy Lab, European School of Governance, Berlin
Moderator: Marco Zatterin, Deputy Editor, La Stampa
Introduction
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker (currently half-
way through his term) claims to lead a more ‘political’ European 
executive than ever. He was appointed according to a unique, 
lead candidate (Spitzenkandidaten) electoral system. The 
European Parliament introduced this system proactively, 
thereby capturing decision-making power over the next 
Commission president and sidelining the European Council. 
The EP is expected to maintain this procedure for the next round 
of elections in 2019. Yet certain critics demand improvement 
of this system, whose continuation could depend on national 
leaders’ agreement. While acting in an increasingly complicated 
political environment, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) is dealing with challenges to its own legitimacy 
and has been criticised for its judicial activism, most notably 
in its ruling on the EU’s accession to the European Convention 
on Human rights (ECHR). Meanwhile, dissatisfaction with EU 
politics is being expressed by European voters, as reflected in 
increasing support for populist parties.
Key points
Whether the Commission has indeed become more political 
than in the past with regard to its mission (own agenda, right 
of initiative) and its set-up (Commissioners sent by member 
states with the College approved by the EP) was a matter 
of lively debate. However, any (further) politicisation of the 
Commission, such as in targeting outcomes in pursuit of an 
agenda, is contentious, as this might compromise its role as 
enforcer of EU (rule of) law and guardian of EU core values. The 
lead candidate made the election process of the Commission 
president more transparent as it made ‘back-door’ deals public 
for the first time. Yet there is much room for improvement 
because the candidates are fairly unknown among the 
population and because European party families do not truly 
represent different civic groups. The continuation of this 
system greatly depends on the goodwill of Heads of State and 
Government, as this system rests on the EP’s interpretation of 
treaties rather than being anchored in them. Judicial activism of 
Institutions
CEPS gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Centro Studi sul Federalismo for this Lab.
   
the CJEU used to be crucial to define and frame the community 
method in the early days of European integration, whereas there 
is an extensive body of legislation in place today, which forces 
the Court to act less. 
The rise of populism is one of the most dangerous challenges 
that Europe is facing at the moment. This is an even bigger 
challenge at the European than at the national level, as the 
EU constitutes a system of multi-level governance that 
essentially relies on the concept of representation by officials 
and politicians, which populism rejects as an immoral and 
corrupt elite. Some populist parties, such as the Alternative 
für Deutschland (AfD), support a cross-over of economic 
liberalism and value conservatism, as they demand a liberal 
market and a strong private sector and at the same time a 
perpetuation of traditional societal values and beliefs. Ever 
since the economic crisis, European citizens perceive the EU as 
incompetent and ill-prepared to tackle today’s multiple crises, 
which fuels the populist argument. Yet populist forces do not 
offer real, constructive alternatives. It is likely that they will burn 
themselves out and prove incompetent and/or corrupt, which 
would create the momentum for mainstream parties to show 
credibility and prove their competence to govern.
Implications for policymakers
Although not elected, the Commission is based on solid legitimate 
grounds, as it is appointed by the national governments and 
approved by the European Parliament. Commentators should 
stop questioning the Commission’s legitimacy by comparing it 
to national governments and instead acknowledge the mixed 
‘DNA’ of the EU and the numerous constitutional concepts 
behind its general construction.
The CJEU acts with more reservation than it has in the past, 
but an impression of activism still emerges, especially when 
legislators are unable to find a compromise and oblige the 
Court to take a decision on certain policy issues. Politicians 
and policymakers should safeguard the neutrality of the 
Court’s jurisdiction by keeping it free from political decisions. 
There is no silver bullet to fight populism across Europe, 
but it is important to overcome the dividing lines that have 
emerged and intensified lately, such as between southern 
and northern EU states (particularly on austerity) and 
between rural and urban areas. 
To constructively face and fight populism and Eurosceptic 
tendencies, European actors should not only produce better 
policy results, but also reach out to the national level, particularly 
to MEPs in their respective constituencies. National politicians 
and policymakers also play a crucial role in building bridges 
between the EU and its citizens.
Special Session:  
Launch of the CEPS Task Force Report on 
EU Reform
Speakers: Joaquín Almunia, Chairman of the CEPS Board of 
Directors and Member of the CEPS Task Force on EU Reform; 
Steven Blockmans, Senior Research Fellow and Head, EU 
Foreign Policy Unit, CEPS; Sophia Russack, Researcher, 
co-rapporteur of the Task Force, CEPS; Rosen Plevneliev, 
former President of Bulgaria
The European Union is facing an existential crisis. With the 
spectre of Brexit looming, the EU27 have embarked on the 
‘Bratislava Process’ to provide the European Union with a 
vision for the future, to be unveiled on the occasion of the 
60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties. A CEPS Task Force of 
eminent persons is engaged in its own reflection process to 
offer practical recommendations to refit the EU for purpose. 
The discussions at the Task Force meetings were captured 
in the report launched during this session.
In presenting the Task Force report, Joaquín Almunia 
focused on the recommendations that are structured along 
the report’s three buildings blocks: i) border management, 
ii) socio-economic and monetary integration and iii) a 
citizens’ Union. Rosen Plevneliev, former Bulgarian President, 
reflected on the report as a neutral commentator. Subsequent 
questions from the audience triggered debate, particularly on 
the sense and sensibility of introducing a euro area finance 
minister; improving the lead candidate system; introducing a 
green card procedure for national parliaments and the need 
to mobilise civic platforms in member states.
The report itself offers 18 concrete and actionable 
recommendations, addressing politicians and policymakers 
at EU and national level. These ideas lie within the current 
Treaty framework where possible, but also go beyond if 
necessary. Hence, immediate implementation is possible 
in most cases, but some recommendations should also be 
considered for a broader long-term approach and a future 
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Special Session:  
Je t’aime! Moi non plus? The European 
Union, its Citizens and the Struggle for 
Support
Speakers: Catherine de Vries, Professor of Politics, 
University of Essex; Isabell Hoffmann, Head of eupinions, 
europeanwide surveys by Bertelsmann Stiftung
Introduction
In this special session the key results of two studies based 
on eupionion, which are Europe-wide surveys conducted by 
Bertelsmann Stiftung) were presented: one focusing on the 
views of millennials (here defined as 14-34 years) on the future 
of the EU and the euro and one examining the rationale behind 
current support for populism across Europe.
Key points 
Millennials are much less polarised than older voters (over 
34 years of age, who are often either very positive or negative 
towards the EU), but there is a divide among the millennials, as 
they are more positive about the EU if they are still in education 
than if they have already entered the job market. Generally, young 
voters know much less about the EU than older generations.  
Globalisation seems to be the decisive factor behind the 
demand for changes away from the political mainstream. 
Conflict between progressive and traditional values plays a 
minor role.
Europeans are almost equally split when it comes to how they 
view globalisation: a slim majority sees globalisation as an 
opportunity (55%), while 45% sees it as a threat. Voters who 
fear globalisation are more likely to vote for populist parties, but 
there are considerable country differences when it comes to 
globalisation fears: in France and Austria, a majority of voters 
see globalisation as a threat. Age is a relevant variable in the 
context of attitudes towards globalisation: the younger the 
voter, the less afraid s/he is of globalisation. Gender does not 
appear to play a role in influencing these attitudes.
  Recommended reading from  
CEPS research:  
  Recent Case Law on External Competences of  
the European Union: How Member States can 
embrace their own Treaty, January 2017
 Friedrich Erlbacher
 Can the EU survive in an age of populism?,  
 January 2017
 Daniel Gros
  Despite teething problems, the ECI stimulates 
European-wide debates, March 2017
  Katja Tuokko and Justin Greenwood
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Europe in the World
EU-Turkey 2.0
Discussion Leaders: Nathalie Tocci, Deputy Director, 
Istituto Affari Internazionali; Sinan Ülgen, Chairman, Centre 
for Economics and Foreign Policy; H.E. Cornelis van Rij, 
Ambassador of the Netherlands to Turkey; Maciej Popowski, 
Deputy Director-General, DG NEAR, European Commission
Moderator: Toby Vogel, Research Communications Officer, CEPS
Saudi-Iranian relations: What role for the 
EU in stabilising the Middle East?
Discussion Leaders: Julien Barnes-Dacey, Senior Policy 
Fellow, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR); 
Clarisse Pásztory, Head of Erbil Liaison Office, EU Delegation 
to Iraq, European External Action Service (EEAS); Richard 
Giragosian, Director, Regional Studies Centre, Yerevan
Moderator: Steven Blockmans, Senior Research Fellow and 
Head of EU Foreign Policy Unit, CEPS
Eastern promises: Are the association 
agreements living up to expectations?
Discussion Leaders: Eka Tkeshelashvili, President, Georgian 
Institute for Strategic Studies; Dirk Schuebel, Head of Division 
Eastern Partnership bilateral, European External Action 
Service; Oleksandr Sushko, Research Director, Institute for 
Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, Kyiv
Moderator: Hrant Kostanyan, Researcher, CEPS
Introduction
Europe and its citizens are directly affected by events in 
neighbouring regions. The EU works with its neighbours to 
build on common interests and values, so it is appropriate to 
discuss: i) the direction of EU-Turkey relations considering 
the strategic importance of Turkey and the interdependence 
of the EU and Turkey in terms of regional security, migration 
deal and trade; ii) the role of the EU in stabilising the Middle 
East where the established system of states and borders are 
under pressure and the population is oppressed and iii) the 
lessons that can be learned from the implementation of the 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs) and the 
Association Agreements (AAs) with member countries of the 
Eastern Partnership.
Key points
Considering EU-Turkey relations, the main conclusion was that 
the EU should stick to the positive aspects on the agenda. It 
can also construct a complementary framework that can be an 
alternative to accession to move forward. It is clear that Turkey 
has been backsliding on Copenhagen political criteria, but there 
is no structural reason for Turkey to end the accession process, 
as there is more to lose than gain by doing so. Turkey and the 
EU are interdependent and need to work together. The potential 
benefits of a Customs Union are impressive for both sides. 
From a European security perspective, the deep historical and 
religious rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia is a hugely 
significant driver of division in terms of geopolitics and energy. 
Iran and Saudi Arabia are acting both defensively and offensively. 
Their domestic economic challenges, structural limitations and 
demographic issues should also be considered. The rivalry 
between these countries has escalated to a dangerous level. 
One should not forget that the EU has various interests in the 
Middle East, among them external security, migration and 
energy. There is a lot that EU institutions and member states 
can do, but it takes political will to invest politically, economically 
and militarily.   
   Nathalie Tocci, Sinan Ülgen & H.E. Cornelis van Rij
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Relations between the EU and the countries of the Eastern 
Partnership that have AAs with the EU, namely Georgia, Ukraine 
and Moldova, aim to bring about irreversible democracy. 
There is little awareness in Eastern Partnership countries of 
the possibilities of an AA or a DCFTA, even within economic 
interest groups and business. Moreover, some interest groups 
are undermining the process of AAs. Ukraine, in particular, 
would like to be a part of the policy development process 
in the EU rather than being obliged to just follow the rules 
adopted in Europe. There are still vulnerabilities in Georgia 
because of the polarisation of politics there. Moldova suffers 
from systemic corruption and the recent election of a pro-
Russian candidate as president of the country complicates 
its relations with the EU. The Russia factor in this region 
should also be taken into account. 
Implications for policymakers
Turkey and the EU should work towards the modernisation of 
the Customs Union as a priority. Negotiations should continue 
and Turkey should be supported in its efforts to resolve the 
refugee crisis. As for the deterioration of the rule of law, if 
Turkey crosses red lines such as introducing the death penalty, 
it should mean the end of negotiations. The potential impact 
of new constitutional amendments should be evaluated and 
necessary steps should be taken if the separation of powers is 
not respected. 
In the Middle East, the EU can work with sub-national partners 
to create governable and economically viable spaces. It should 
also continue to support the region economically, institutionally 
and educationally. Moreover, the EU should strategically 
broaden its constituency in the Middle East and focus on the 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses in the region to combat the 
causes of these weaknesses. 
In order to realise an AA/DCFTA, an inclusive process is 
necessary, whereby more of society is involved and different 
interest groups are represented, especially in policy formation. 
In Ukraine, for example, reforms are needed in the energy sector, 
banking, the judiciary and public administration. The aim of the 
Eastern Partnership is to integrate these countries into the EU 
market. People should understand what can be improved in 
their lives as a result of the EU’s actions. To realise this, more 
needs to be done to raise awareness about EU projects.
  Recommended reading from  
CEPS research:  
  Why the EU should terminate accession 
negotiations with Turkey, April 2017
 Steven Blockmans and Sinem Yilmaz
 EU-Iran Relations after the Nuclear Deal, May 2016
  Steven Blockmans, Anoushiravan Ehteshami and  
Gawdat Bahgat
  Assessing the European Neighbourhood Policy: 
Perspectives from the literature, February 2017
  Hrant Kostanyan
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Brexit
Brexit and the City
Discussion Leaders: Jeremy Browne, Special Representative 
of the City of London to the EU; Joe V. Bannister, Chairman, 
Malta Financial Services Authority; Laura Ahto, CEO, Bank of 
New York Mellon European Bank
Moderator: Nick Collier, Global Head of Government and 
Regulatory Affairs, Thomson Reuters
The financial centre of London has grown to the size it is 
today because of the EU’s single market. It is an asset for the 
EU, and Brexit will be a cost, not only for the UK’s financial 
industry, but also for the provision of financial services in 
the rest of the EU. A centre allows conglomeration factors 
to operate, and efficiency and specialisation to prevail. 
Brexit will lead to more fragmentation, and slow the process 
of concentration in the EU’s financial centres.
The future structure of trade in financial services between 
the EU and the UK is still an open question. The equivalence 
provision for access to the EU’s single market is not adapted 
to the degree of market integration between the EU and the 
UK. A broader and more certain equivalence regime is thus 
needed, but the UK may also consider a lighter regime, and 
thus increase regulatory competition.
For Laura Ahti of BoNY Mellon, the business model of the 
bank will not be affected by Brexit, as it is active in many 
different EU countries. For Jeremy Brown of the City of 
London Corporation, the City will remain preeminent in 
Europe. But other financial centres should not try to attract 
City business to their advantage, said Jo Bannister of the 
Maltese FSE. Limitations on migration may also affect the 
prospects of the City, it was argued. 
Leaving the EU without leaving the single 
market
Discussion Leaders: The Rt Hon. Liz Kendall, MP, member 
of the Exiting the EU Committee, House of Commons; 
Laurence W. Gormley, Visiting Professor at European 
Studies Department, College of Europe
Moderator: Marco Incerti, Head of Communications, CEPS
The Brexit White Paper, published on February 2nd by HM 
government, set the stage for the start of negotiations 
following the triggering of Article 50 (which took place 
about one month after the Ideas Lab), and called for a 
Strategic Partnership (and not an Association Agreement). 
This relationship would include a “bold, ambitious and 
comprehensive Free Trade Agreement.”
Some thought that the UK government seemed determined 
to shut down all debate on the UK’s future in Europe and 
that Theresa May’s vision for the future of the UK, which 
prioritises low taxes and low immigration, departed radically 
from the views of many EU leaders. 
It was agreed that efforts must be made to ensure that the 
tone of the debate in the UK and the negotiations with the 
EU remain civil and cooperative. The current harshness is 
detrimental to the interests of both sides. Priority should 
be given to negotiating a ‘transitional’ agreement that sorts 
out immediate arrangements between the EU and the 
UK, and agreeing to deal with long-term issues at a later 
date. Finally, it is absolutely essential for the UK to remain 
sensitive and open to questions of immigration.
   Laura Ahto, Jeremy Browne, Joe V. Bannister & Nick Collier
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More defence in a UK-less EU?
Discussion Leaders: Marta Dassù, Chairwoman, ASPEN 
Institute Italia; Daniel Keohane, Senior Researcher, Centre 
for Security Studies, Zurich
Moderator: Giovanni Faleg, Associate Research Fellow, CEPS
It was widely emphasised that one ought to think 
pragmatically about the future of European defence (the 
EU and NATO), as the UK is one of the key players in this 
arena. The EU needs to strike a sound, sustainable deal with 
the UK to keep it as a close external partner for the EU in 
the deployments of the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP), capability generation and defence industry 
cooperation. The panel also discussed whether Brexit would 
facilitate the emergence of a new core in the CSDP, promoted 
by France, Germany and Italy, particularly given the roadmap 
for deeper integration set out in the 2016 EU Global Strategy 
and the security and defence implementation plan. 
The two main recommendations emerged from the session 
for policymakers: i) it is paramount to keep the UK as close 
as possible to CSDP decision-making and include it in CSDP 
operations and ii) EU member states should invest in building 
a more deeply integrated defence and technology industrial 
base, under the guidance of the European Defence Agency and 
a more proactive European Commission, but at the same time 
they should not shut the door to bilateral agreements with the 
UK on defence procurement. 
The EU should move politically towards a European Defence 
Union, including the full use of the permanent structured 
cooperation – PESCO instruments available under the Treaty of 
Lisbon, but pragmatism and realism should also be used when 
negotiating a good defence deal with the UK and its inclusion in 
future initiatives. 
 
  Recommended reading from  
CEPS research:  
 EU Financial Market Access after Brexit,  
 September 2016
 Karel Lannoo
  An Assessment of the Economic Impact of Brexit 
on the EU27, March 2017
  Michael Emerson, Matthias Busse, Mattia Di Salvo, 
Daniel Gros and Jacques Pelkmans
  The Implications of Brexit for the EU’s Common 
Security and Defence Policy, July 2016
  Giovanni Faleg   Daniel Keohane, Giovanni Faleg & Marta Dassù
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Speakers: Enrico Letta, President, Jacques Delors Institute, 
former Prime Minister of Italy; Mikołaj Dowgielewicz, 
Representative to the EU Institutions, European Investment 
Bank; Elspeth Guild, Senior Research Fellow at Justice 
and Home Affairs, CEPS; Rear-admiral Mário Marques, 
Chairman, European Coast Guard Functions Forum; Udo 
Zolleis, Senior Official, Ministry of the Interior, the Free 
State of Bavaria
Moderator: Valentina Pop, Reporter ,  Wall Street Journal
Introduction
One of the main EU responses to the surge in asylum seekers 
via Greece and the Balkans in 2015-16, instigating the so-called 
‘refugee crisis’, has been the creation of the European Border 
and Coast Guard (EBCG) to incorporate coast guards in border 
management. The Commission has also put forward a package 
of proposals to recast the Common European Asylum System, 
most importantly, extending the mandate of the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO). Yet, do these proposals address 
the true deficiencies in EU border and asylum policies? What 
should be the main EU policy responses? What can we expect 
from development cooperation and investment in countries 
of origin and transit? What should be responses within the 
refugee-receiving countries?
Key points
Former Prime Minister of Italy Enrico Letta questioned whether 
we can afford to continue talking about ‘crisis’ responses. 
Although substantial numbers of asylum seekers have reached 
Greece via the Aegean Sea since summer 2015, the numbers 
in the Central Mediterranean have remained stable for several 
years. Thus, is it realistic to place expectations on the coast 
guard to manage the crisis? The chairman of the European Coast 
Guard Function Forum stressed that solutions lie in defence, 
diplomacy and development, not in the sea. The EIB Brussels 
representative supported the call to address long-lasting global 
refugee challenges in a holistic manner. Elspeth Guild, Senior 
Research Fellow at CEPS, called for a change of focus from 
seeing refugees as a ‘burden’ to refugees as ‘an opportunity’. 
According to Eurostat, EU member states issued 2.5 million First 
Residence permits for work and family reunification reasons 
in 2015. Seen from this perspective, the refugee ‘crisis’ is not 
so obvious; when will the EU adopt evidence-based migration 
and asylum policies? Finally, can the EU cooperate with third 
countries, like Libya, without compromising its commitment to 
fundamental rights?
Implications for policymakers
The CEPS Task Force report on the European Border and Coast 
Guard Agency made the following proposals: 
There should be a de-linking of asylum responsibility from 
search and rescue (SAR) operations by dropping temporary 
relocation decisions in exchange for targeted reform of the 
Dublin system. But if Dublin is not reframed as truly European, 
there could be a specific SAR relocation mechanism, in which 
those rescued at sea would be assigned to any one of the EU 
member states according to a quota system, not to the first 
country of irregular arrival. 
The	 EBCG	 should	 fill	 in	 the	 gap	 and	 lead	 SAR	 operations. 
At the moment, EPN Triton operational areas are located at too 
great a distance from where SAR incidents take place, so the 
operational area should be expanded. Operations should be of a 
civilian nature and have a clearly humanitarian purpose. 
  		Valendina	Pop,	Mikołaj	Dowgielewicz,	Enrico	Letta,	Elspeth	Guild,	 
Rear-admiral Mário Marques & Udo Zolleis
Prime Talk: In Troubled Waters - Migration 
Challenges in the Mediterranean
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A merged European Border and Asylum Service (EBAS) should 
be established. This should be a professional EU civil service, 
endowed with its own staff and command/decision capability. 
Managing borders and asylum policy should be a shared legal 
responsibility between the EU and member states. This is in line 
with the Lisbon Treaty provision to adopt “any measure for the 
establishment of Integrated Border Management”. 
More legal pathways to reach Europe for both asylum seekers 
and economic migrants should be opened up. The first category 
should be covered by the Geneva Convention and benefit from 
humanitarian visas, family reunification and resettlement. The 
second category should benefit from mobility, as there are skills 
shortages in the EU at all levels. 
The root causes of migration should be addressed. Stabilise 
the countries of origin and provide more incentives and aid for 
development. 
  Recommended reading from  
CEPS research:  
  The European Border and Coast Guard:  
Addressing migration and asylum challenges in  
the Mediterranean?, February 2017
  Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans, Jean-Pierre 
Cassarino, Daniel Gros and Elspeth Guild
  EU-Turkey plan for handling refugees is fraught 
with legal and procedural challenges, March 2016
 Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild
  A European Border and Coast Guard: What’s in a 
name?, March 2016
  Sergio Carrera and Leonhard den Hertog
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Speakers: Jens Meier, Chairman of the Management Board, 
Hamburg Port Authority; Djoomart Otorbaev, former Prime 
Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic; Sun Mingxi, Counsellor, 
Mission of China to the EU
Moderator: Astrid Skala-Kuhmann, Director for Global 
Partnerships, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Zusammenarbeit 
After President Xi Jinping’s speech at the World Economic 
Forum at the start of 2017, it became clear that China has 
transformed itself from being one of the most protectionist 
economies in the world into a strong defender of international 
trade and cooperation. This sound strategic approach, 
however, is not yet matched by liberal market access policies 
or by reducing FDI restrictions. The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) 
initiative is a telling example of this new era in China. Since its 
launch, China has significantly invested in infrastructure to 
improve land transportation towards the EU, while offering and 
organising wide-ranging international cooperation to stimulate 
the participation of many countries. 
For the first time in history, China has become Germany’s 
number-one trading partner, overtaking the US and all other 
European countries. This in itself is a clear sign of the need to 
improve talks with China, and the OBOR initiative is an incredible 
opportunity to do so while enhancing the relationship with 
Central Asia, which has implications for the development of 
the entire region, especially as most of the countries in Central 
Asia are landlocked and have always suffered from their 
isolated geographical position. Indeed, without these countries’ 
involvement in the initiative, its realisation would not be possible, 
or at least not meaningful. Indeed, most of the trains arriving 
today in the EU from China do not return at anywhere near 
full capacity. It is thus of crucial importance for Central Asian 
countries, as well as for China as the final destination, to fill the 
gap and make this huge means of transportation sustainable 
and cost-effective.
Moreover, the One Belt, One Road initiative could help the 
transition from a supply-driven to a demand-driven relationship 
between the two economic blocs. As a speaker pointed out, 
the enhancement of infrastructure and living standards is a 
necessary condition for a demand-driven business relationship, 
and this initiative aims to improve both factors across all 
countries involved. 
The initiative is thus a strategic opportunity for both the EU and 
China to i) tighten existing relationships, ii) create new ones with 
countries ‘in the middle’, and iii) improve stability in the Central 
Asian region by fostering economic and social development.
. 
  Recommended reading from  
CEPS research:  
  Tomorrow’s Silk Road: Assessing an EU-China  
Free Trade Agreement, April 2016
  Jacques Pelkmans, Weinian Hu, Federica Mustilli,  
Mattia Di Salvo, Joseph Francois, Eddy Bekkers,  
Miriam Manchin and Patrick Tomberger
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Speakers: Nadia Calviño, Director General, DG BUDGET 
European Commission; Mario Monti, Member of the Italian 
Senate and Chair of the High Level Group on Own Resources, 
European Commission; Giacomo Benedetto, Senior Lecturer 
in Politics & Jean Monnet, Chair in European Union Budget 
Policies at Royal Holloway, University of London
Moderator: Jorge Núñez Ferrer, Senior Research Fellow, CEPS
Introduction
There are signs of a change in approach by member states. 
They realise the need to use the EU budget to provide for citizens’ 
most pressing demands, i.e. jobs and security, but delivering 
on those fronts will also help to combat Euroscepticism and 
populism. More generally, the focus on the EU’s added value is 
gradually diminishing the relevance of net balances. 
The rigid system of seven-year planning has been criticised. If, on 
the one hand, it is necessary to introduce additional flexibility to 
respond to unforeseen events and changing priorities, on the other 
hand, it is crucial to ensure predictability of long-term investment, 
which also enhances the macro-economic stabilising function of 
structural funds. In other words, the MFF can be reformed, but it 
has to remain an instrument for mid- to long-term planning.  
The problem with the EU budget should not be framed 
uniquely as a communications strategy issue. The EU has lost 
legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens and must regain it. This 
goes beyond communication, which also needs to be improved, 
but an economic narrative alone will not suffice. Efficiency and 
competitiveness are not the only reasons for which we need a 
Union and its budget. The Council is moving forward on border 
protection, tax harmonisation and increasingly, on defence.
The EU budget is perceived as being mismanaged and non-
transparent, despite following IPSAS international accountability 
standards, being discharged by the European Court of Auditors 
and published online in detail.
Implications for policymakers
Steps must be taken to make the EU budget more 
understandable to people. Europe is not a zero-sum game 
and in order to free it from such a mentality, the budget must 
be able to reflect that reality. There is a call to abandon the net 
balance approach, which has characterised most budgetary 
negotiations, but is now preventing the EU from having the 
necessary means to deal with its increasing priorities. 
Allocating just 2% of EU resources to security and citizenship 
is a huge failing; there are too few means to deal with the 
migration crisis, and top EU priorities do not appear to be in 
line with budgetary allocations. But how to move beyond the 
seemingly sacrosanct political decision to limit the budget to 1% 
of EU GNI? Size should be de-mystified; nobody knows what the 
right figure is, but it should be in line with agreed commitments 
and needs. 
The EU budget should be seen as public expenditure of 
the EU28. Consequently, increasing the EU budget should 
correspond to diminishing national expenditures, not to an 
increase in the fiscal burden; it should in fact decrease the 
burden. Fiscal consolidation at member state level should be 
coupled with increasing EU expenditure, as this expenditure is 
mainly linked – with the exception of agricultural subsidies – to 
investment generating European public goods and growth. 
Brexit brings risk but also opportunities to re-think own 
resources and expenditures. With the UK out of the picture, 
one key reason for the net balance approach vanishes. Will 
all rebates be abandoned? Can more contribution from GNI 
be considered? Is it possible to replace the roughly €10 billion 
loss from the UK’s net contribution with new own resources? 
Perhaps the short time frame in which the decision has to be 
taken is a positive factor. A ‘crisis’ demands a response. While a 
fall in the budget will be a problem, what matters is not that the 
budget falls from €150 billion to €140 billion, but rather what is 
to be done with the remaining €140 billion. 
Some recommend a more majoritarian model in adopting 
budget decisions. This shift can make the system more dynamic 
but would lead to a less democratic outcome for member states 
in the minority, making clear who are the winners and losers. 
Coordination and communication with national parliaments 
need to be improved.
Prime Talk: EU Budget Reforms for post-
2020 - Perfect Storm or Flop?
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Speakers: Myron Ebell, Director, Center for Energy and 
Environment Competitive Enterprise Institute and former 
Head, Transition Team, US Environmental Protection Agency; 
Surya Sethi, former Principal Adviser Power and Energy 
and Core Climate Negotiator, Government of India; Enrico 
Giovannini, Professor, University of Rome Tor Vergata
Moderator: Christian Egenhofer, Associate Senior Research 
Fellow, Head of the Energy and Climate programme and 
Director of Energy Climate House, CEPS 
With the election of Donald Trump as US President, the coalition 
between the US and China that provided the impetus for the 
Paris Agreement has fallen apart. Myron Ebell, who led the 
transition for the Environmental Protection Agency for the 
Trump Administration, made it clear that the US will withdraw 
from global climate policy. Besides the campaign promises 
to overturn Obama’s Clean Power Plan and withdraw from 
the Paris Agreement, Ebell remarked how the US will probably 
cancel US funding for UN climate bodies. 
For Enrico Giovannini, there are many reasons for the EU to try 
to fill this leadership gap. Failure to lead on climate change could 
have negative repercussions for trade and international relations 
as well, given how closely interwoven climate policy is with the 
rest of the global agenda. Teresa Ribera and Surya Sethi added 
that the EU is punching below its weight if it considers global 
equity to be a priority. By leading on this issue, the EU could gain 
clout and legitimacy, particularly among those countries most 
vulnerable to climate change impacts. In the current political 
environment, however, it is not easy for the 28 EU member 
states to agree on common positions and move with the agility 
that is required to exercise such global leadership.
    Christian Egenhofer, Enrico Giovannini, Myron Ebell, Teresa Ribera &  
Surya Sethi
Prime Talk: Who will continue to carry the 
torch? Changing global climate change  
leaders in the Trump era
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Speakers: Tim Hwang, Public Policy Counsel, Google; 
Vince Conitzer, Professor, Duke University; Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong, Professor in Practical Ethics in the Department 
of Philosophy and the Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke 
University; Jérôme Perrin, VP Scientific Director, Renault; 
Toby Walsh, Guest Professor, TU Berlin and Professor, AI, 
UNSW Australia
Moderator: Andrea Renda, Senior Research Fellow and Head of 
Regulatory Policy Unit, CEPS 
Artificial intelligence (AI) and algorithms offer a dazzling array 
of technical advances for humanity, as well as the frightening 
prospect that machines, not humans, will dominate our world. 
After outlining both the hopes and fears surrounding new 
technology, the academic and business leaders who are 
engaged in the quest to set ground rules for a safe, ethical and 
human-friendly AI discussed its impact on employment and 
inequality, and the role of government in both encouraging and 
policing it. 
Al algorithms process and organise information. Originally 
programmed to remove human error and bias from decision-
making, AI today supports and complements human thinking. 
Most agreed that machines are rather slow, inefficient learners, 
and a long way off from displaying key human qualities of 
intuition and common sense.
Even so, participants agreed that modern AI can outperform 
humans in specific tasks. AI algorithms help maximise trading 
volumes, improve demand and supply matching and reduce 
transaction costs. In manufacturing, AI-powered machines 
replace workers in heavy, perilous and highly repetitive tasks, 
which many participants thought could widen the polarisation 
within the labour force. At the same time, AI could create new 
job opportunities for those who create and operate machines.
Recent breakthroughs saw AI systems beat world champions 
in strategy games like chess, Go and poker. It was also argued 
that driverless cars were safer than human-driven vehicles and 
would drastically cut the number of road accidents. 
As AI can take critical decisions alone, without human influence 
on the outcome, the academics on the panel highlighted 
its existential and ethical challenges for society. Some, for 
example, called for a clear ban on autonomous weapons. But 
such black and white decisions are rare; in a world driven by 
AI, we must answer tough questions in shades of grey. What 
moral principles must guide the programming of machines? If 
driverless cars must choose between running over a pedestrian 
or endangering a passenger, for example, who is responsible for 
the consequences? 
Answers to these tough questions require the development of 
balanced safety and liability requirements in law. Policymakers 
should engage with stakeholders to adopt safeguards and 
incentives for more transparency and accountability. 
The role of governments should focus on curbing negative 
externalities. Taxing automation is ill-conceived. Companies 
should not be punished for chasing efficiency and developing 
beneficial new technologies. Instead, governments should 
promote an even distribution of benefits. Everyone agreed that 
we must prepare for a world in which machines play a greater 
role. But everyone also agreed that humans can continue to 
control their environment. Automation, after all, cannot replace 
human care and creativity.
   Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Jérôme Perrin & Andrea Renda
Prime Talk: Ex Machina - Towards an Ethics 
of Algorithms
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Speakers: Daniel Mitov, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Bulgaria; Anthony Luzzatto Gardner, former US Ambassador 
to the EU; Reza Moghadam, Vice-Chairman for Global Capital 
Markets, Morgan Stanley; Heather Grabbe, Director, Open 
Society European Policy Institute
Introduction
The eurozone crisis that unfolded after 2009 has tested not only 
the effectiveness of EU institutions but their legitimacy and the 
values on which they are built, including the notion of solidarity 
between the member states. Various developments originating 
outside the EU – notably the migration crisis of 2015-16 – have 
heightened doubts about the robustness of the EU model, 
which received an additional psychological blow with the UK’s 
decision to leave the Union. The election of Donald Trump and 
Russia’s increasing assertiveness abroad (e.g. in Ukraine and 
Syria) have added to the anxiety, suggesting that traditional 
approaches to international affairs may no longer be viable. In 
the worst case, Trump’s policies could upend old alliances. In 
all this, the EU has not been an active player and has failed to 
shape its environment.
Key points
The EU’s legitimacy is at stake across three broad building sites: 
i) the euro, ii) migration and asylum and iii) and foreign policy 
and defence. 
While the transatlantic relationship is undergoing a crisis 
following Trump’s inauguration, there continues to be a range 
of sectoral issues where the two sides have shared interests, 
including counterterrorism, trade, defence and intellectual 
property rights. Such issues could serve as building blocks for 
the reconstruction of a broader alliance, although US relations 
with Europe are likely to remain more transactional than they 
have been at any point in the past several decades. 
By questioning the European contribution to NATO’s collective 
defence, the Trump administration might provide momentum 
for renewed defence commitments. Germany already appears 
poised to step up its engagement.
Implications for policymakers
The EU should deepen its involvement in guarding its external 
borders – to prevent unauthorised entry – and, in turn, in 
creating space for the Union’s internal solidarity. It is important 
that the EU demonstrate to its citizens that it is capable of joint 
action in an area that is seen by many as deeply problematic. 
The EU must think much more strategically about foreign policy 
and emerging actors such as China. 
The EU should actively defend the brand of liberal, free-market 
democracy, which is under attack by Russia, and its counter-
narrative of democracy as an alien, western construct. 
Other member states should undertake their own balance of 
competences reviews on the UK model to better understand 
what value the EU has for them, and where the set-up might 
need adjustment. 
The EU needs to bring its house in order before it can regain 
international credibility – e.g. cleaning up its bank balance 
sheets by removing the bad assets. It should also concentrate 
its energies and talent on tackling some of the big questions 
that will shape the coming decades, such as climate change.
   
Concluding Plenary: Scenarios for the EU in a 
Changing World
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Speaker: Timothy Garton Ash, Professor, Oxford University
Professor Garton Ash gave the final academic lecture of this 
year’s Ideas Lab to a packed house keen to hear his analysis. 
He argued that one can trace the roots of today’s crises 
of the European project to the moment of one of Europe’s 
greatest triumphs: the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In fact, 
Garton Ash cited eight lines of causality that stretch from 
the current crises to developments that have their origin at 
around the same time. 
The year 1989 was a watershed for Europe, in many ways. 
As Communism fell, the ideals of freedom and democracy 
grew and Eastern Europe naturally wanted to join the 
European Union, with its freedom of movement across 
national borders. One of the unintended consequences of 
this freedom was the massive migration to the UK, which 
was perhaps the biggest single reason for the Brexit vote. 
Garton Ash also argued that another consequence of 1989 
was the birth of the euro. As a quid pro quo for reunification, 
Germany had to relinquish control over its currency. 
But, given its incomplete design, the euro area was not 
able to deal with the fall-out from the Great Financial Crisis 
of 2007-08. High unemployment and low growth in the 
euro area have provided populists with the argument that 
European integration simply does not work. 
But 1989 was also the year of Tiananmen Square and the 
brutal repression of a democratic uprising. China formally 
stuck with Communism, but de facto created ‘Leninist 
capitalism’, as Timothy Garton Ash termed it, allowing the 
country to benefit fully from the wave of globalisation that 
also started around this time.  
Globalisation not only fostered rapid growth in China, it also 
created losers everywhere, especially unskilled workers 
whose economic and cultural status declined as their jobs 
went to China and India. Better educated elites had secure 
jobs with rising incomes, which made it easier for them 
to embrace globalisation and multiculturalism. Populists 
claim to give a voice to those who feel left behind, both 
economically and culturally.
Garton Ash ended on the sobering note that the current 
wave of populism might not yet have reached its peak. 
Turning the tide will not only require reform in Europe, 
but also an enduring effort to create an alternative and 
emotionally appealing narrative.
Timothy Garton Ash’s speech was recorded and is available in 
full here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eZK7B0Wjlqc
   Timothy Garton Ash
Special Lecture: European (Dis-)integration in 
an Age of Populism
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